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Abstract Component-based systems evolve as a new component is added or an existing one is
replaced by a newer version. Hence, it is appealing to assure the new system still preserves its
safety properties. However, instead of inspecting the new system as a whole, which may result
in a large state space, it is beneficial to reuse the verification results by inspecting the newly
added component in isolation. To this aim, we study the problem of model checking component-
based asynchronously communicating systems in the presence of an unspecified component against
safety properties. Our solution is based on assume-guarantee reasoning, adopted for asynchronous
environments, which generates the weakest assumption. If the newly added component conforms to
the assumption, then the whole system still satisfies the property. To make the approach efficient
and convergent, we produce an overapproximated interface of the missing component and by its
composition with the rest of the system components, we achieve an overapproximated specification
of the system, from which we remove those traces of the system that violate the property and
generate an assumption for the missing component.
We have implemented our approach on two case studies. Furthermore, we compared our results
with the state of the art direct approach. Our resulting assumptions are smaller in size and achieved
faster.
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Fig. 1: An asynchronous system with an unspecified component M
1 Introduction
In the basic use of model checking to verify a system, it is usually assumed that all of the components
of the system are specified. The system specification is transformed into a monolithic transition
system against which temporal logic properties are verified [11]. In the domain of Component-Based
Software Engineering (CBSE), the system is composed of several reusable components, usually
developed by different vendors. The notion of component is generally assumed to be substitutable
[68]. When applying model checking to a component-based system, the question is if we can reuse
the verification results, the same way we reuse software components. In other words, should we
generate the monolithic transition system for the whole system when a new component is added or
an existing one is replaced by a newer version, or can we find a way to verify the newly added or
modified component?
This question is not limited to the classical use of CBSE, but is also valid in the context of
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) [71,39], in which services can be viewed as asynchronously
communicating components. Changes to the components in such a system may be caused by mi-
grating legacy systems into new services. Since this kind of migration usually takes place when the
system is operational, the problem of verification of the new system can be very important [5,17,58,
51]. In such cases, the specification of the legacy system may not be available. This is the case for
the black-box modernization approaches towards migration such as [17] . Although model checking
of SOA-based systems has been studied in several works [32,73,27,33], the problem of analyzing
systems with unspecified components is not considered.
In a component-based system, where the components are developed by various vendors, it is
usually common for the components to be integrated using asynchronous message passing. Since the
coupling caused by such an integration mechanism is more loose than traditional remote procedure
call approach, it allows more heterogeneity among the components, resulting in a higher degree of
reuse, higher availability and scalability in the system [52]. Moreover, asynchronous communication
is the common interaction mechanism used in distributed systems gaining more attention as the
trend towards Cyber-Physical Systems is rapidly growing. Therefore we have chosen asynchronously
communicating environments as the context of our work.
In this paper, we study the problem of model checking component-based systems communicating
asynchronously on bounded channels in the presence of an unspecified component against safety
properties. Consider the system of Figure 1 where the component M operates as a service and its
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specification is unavailable or subject to modifications. The rest of the components, which form an
open system O, are specified. Some basic information about the open system interactions with its
environment in terms of the exchanged messages is presumed (described more formally in Section
3.1). This information is provided by the system modeler or is extracted from the documents of
the components in O. The system is required to satisfy a certain safety property P . Our problem
can be reduced to an assumption generation problem, applied in the context of assume-guarantee
reasoning [46,61]: We would like to find an assumption A such that if M satisfies A, then the system
will satisfy P . Hence instead of verifying the system composed of M and components of O against
P , we verify M against A.
Components encapsulate their data and functions and are loosely implemented without any
pre-assumption about their environment. Hence, the formal behavior of an open component is too
general to cope with any environment. Conversely, its closed behavior with a specific environment
is reduced substantially due to the specific exertion of the component behavior by the environment.
This generality, intrinsic in the behavior of the component, makes existing approaches of assume-
guarantee reasoning inapplicable to the asynchronous environments. Existing approaches follow two
main streams: 1) An initial interface is generated and refined based on counterexamples iteratively,
2) The parallel composition of a characteristic model of P and O, usually both specified by LTSs,
is generated and then those traces that violate P are eliminated. The first set of approaches are not
time-efficient [23], may generate a very large assumption and may fail to verify M against A in some
cases [54,7]. Besides, these approaches iteratively use the specification of all components (includ-
ing M) for assumption generation, concluding that for each modified component, the assumption
should be generated from scratch and the verification results cannot be reused. The second set of
approaches, so called direct, are based on the behavior of the open system O, so they may result in
a huge state space or may not converge in bounded time and memory in the asynchronous settings.
To tackle the problem, we take advantage of both courses: we adopt the direct approach of [34], and
readjust it for the asynchronous settings in two respects: 1) We consider an auxiliary component,
which acts as an interface of M , to close the open system; 2) Furthermore, as the interface is still
too general, we consider the effect of P at the level of component.
To provide an asynchronous model for the system, we use the actor model [2,3,4] to specify
components in the system. Such modeling has become very popular in practice [40,41,47]1. To sim-
plify the introduction of our method, we use a simple actor-based language, called Actor Modeling
Language (AML), for describing component models. AML is explained in details in Section 2. Note
that our method can be easily extended to more sophisticated actor-based modeling languages, such
as Rebeca [67,66] or Creol [45,44]. Furthermore, we use Labeled Transition Systems (LTSs) as the
setup for generated assumptions.
The steps of the proposed method are illustrated in Figure 2: By using the information extracted
from the components of the open system we generate an actor which acts as an overapproximated
interface of the missing component M . By special composition of this actor with the actors of the
open system using the property P , an LTS is produced that describes an overapproximation of the
system. At this point we prune the resulted LTS to generate the assumption, adapting the approach
of [34] for the asynchronous setting. The assumption generation step may result in the LTS of the
generated assumption, or a deceleration that the property is always or never satisfied irrespective
to M .
To check a given actor M against the generated assumption, we propose an approach to derive
its LTS characterization in terms of its interactions with an environment in the same line of [69].
1 Scala programming language supports actor-models http://www.scala-lang.org
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Fig. 2: The proposed steps towards assumption generation in the asynchronous setting
Finally we investigate if the LTS conforms to the generated assumption according to the trace
inclusion relation [16].
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the necessary background to our work and
is followed by our presented approach in Section 3. Section 4 discusses our experience with real life
case studies. Section 5 presents the related work. Section 6 concludes the paper and briefly goes
over the future extensions to our work.
2 Background
We introduce AML, an actor-based language for modeling communicating components in concurrent
systems, to study various aspects of actor systems. In this section, we briefly explain the syntax
and semantics of AML. LTSs are used as the formal framework to define the semantics of AML
models and our generated assumptions. We also briefly explain the adapted state-of-the-art direct
approach of [34] towards assumption generation.
2.1 Labeled Transition System
An LTS TL is formally introduced by a quadruple (SL, αTL, RL, s
L
0 ), where SL is the set of states,
sL0 ∈ SL is the initial state, αTL ⊆ Act denotes the set of actions of TL, where Act is the set of all
action labels, and RL ⊆ SL × αTL ∪ {τ} × SL is the transition relation. We use s a−→ s′ to denote
(s, a, s′) ∈ RL, where a ∈ αTL ∪ {τ}. The action τ denotes an internal action of the component
which is unobservable to its environment.
A trace of the LTS TL is a sequence of actions a0 a1 a2 . . . with a corresponding execution path
s0
a0−→ s1 a1−→ s2 a2−→ . . . which starts at the initial state (s0 = sL0 ), and is either infinite or ends in a
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deadlock state [11]. Let Tr(TL) denote the set of all traces of TL and Trfin(TL) denote the set of
all prefixes of traces of TL, i.e., finite traces of TL.
We use the renaming operator to rename the actions of an LTS using the renaming function
c : Act → Act . For a given LTS TL = (SL, αTL, RL, sL0 ), ρc(TL) = (SL, αTρc(L), Rρc(L), sL0 ) where
Rρc(L) = {(s, c(a), s′)|(s, a, s′) ∈ RL} and αTρc(L) = {c(a) | a ∈ αTL}.
2.2 The Actor Modeling Language
The computation model of actors, introduced by Agha [2] for modeling distributed systems, consists
of a set of encapsulated concurrent computation units, called actors, communicating through mes-
sage passing. Each actor has a mailbox with a unique address which stores the received messages
from other actors. It is assumed that the speed of computations is so fast in comparison to the
message transmissions and hence, messages are processed in an atomic manner. Upon processing a
message, an actor can update its local state, create new actors or send messages to other actors.
We introduce AML as the formal foundation of our work to model asynchronous systems. AML
is a toy actor modeling language, inspired by Rebeca [67]. Rebeca is an operational interpretation of
the actor model with formal semantics and model checking tools developed to fill the gap between
formal methods and software engineering [66,67]. AML has omitted some features of Rebeca for
simplicity and is used for studying various aspects of actor systems.
2.2.1 Notation
Given a set Ξ, the set Ξ∗ is the set of all finite sequences over elements of Ξ. For a sequence ξ ∈ Ξ∗
of length n, the symbol ξi denotes the i
th element of the sequence, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In this case,
we may also write ξ as 〈ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξn〉. The empty sequence is represented by , and 〈ι|ξ〉 denotes
a sequence whose head and tail elements are ι ∈ Ξ and ξ, respectively. We use len(ξ) to denote
the length of the sequence ξ. For two sequences ξ and ξ′ over Ξ∗, ξ ⊕ ξ′ is the sequence obtained
by appending ξ′ to the end of ξ. This notation is lifted to the set of sequences in the usual way:
ξ ⊕ {ξ1, . . . , ξn} = ⋃1≤i≤n ξ ⊕ ξi where ξi ∈ Ξ∗. For a function f : X → Y , we use the notation
Model ::= Actor+ main {Send∗ }
Actor ::= actor ID (n) { 〈int Var ; 〉∗ | Methods∗ }
Methods ::= MName { Stat∗ }
Stat ::= Var := Expr; | Conditional | Send | nonDet;
Conditional ::= if (Expr) {Stat∗} else {Stat∗}
Send ::= 〈〈self | ID〉〉 !MName;
nonDet ::= Var :=?(〈〈Expr, 〉〉∗Expr);
Fig. 3: AML syntax: Angle brackets (〈〈 〉〉) are used as meta-parentheses. Superscript + is used for
more than one repetition, and * indicates zero or more repetitions. The symbols ID , MName, and
Var denote the set of actor, method and variable names, respectively. The symbol Expr denotes
the set of arithmetic expressions and n ∈ N signifies the capacity of the actor’s mailbox.
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1 actor client (10) {
2 int l ;
3 reply {
4 l=?(0,1);
5 if ( l==0) {server!request;}
6 else {server !delay;}
7 }
8 }
10 actor server(10) {
12 int z;
13 request {
14 client ! reply ;
15 z=0;
16 }
18 delay{
19 z=1;
20 self !request;
21 }
22 }
24 main {
25 client ! reply ;
26 }
Fig. 4: An example of AML model
f [x 7→ y] to denote the function {(a, b) ∈ f |a 6= x} ∪ {(x, y)}, where x 7→ y is an alternative notation
for (x, y).
2.2.2 Syntax
Each AML model consists of several actor definitions and a main block which is used to specify the
initial messages of the actors. Each actor is specified by using the actor reserved word. The capacity
of the actor’s mailbox is defined as part of its declaration. Each actor has a set of local variables
and methods, where the method m defines the behavior of the actor upon processing a message of
type m. For simplicity method arguments are abstracted away.
The formal syntax of AML is described in Figure 3. An example of an AML model is illustrated
in Figure 4 which consists of two actors, namely client and server with the mailbox capacities of
10. Initially, the message reply is sent to the actor client in the main block. Upon processing the
messages of type reply , the actor client nondeterministically sends a message delay or request to the
actor server . By taking a message delay from its mailbox, server sends a message request to itself,
using the reserved word self, and by taking a message request , responds to client with a message
reply . In both cases, the actor server updates its state variable z.
Each actor is abstractly an instance of the type Actor = ID × 2Var × 2Mtd × N, where:
– ID is the set of all actor identifiers in the model,
– Var is the set of all variable names,
– Mtd = MName × Stat∗ is the set of all method declarations where MName is the set of method
names,
– N is the set of natural numbers.
An actor (id , vars,mtds, n) has the identifier id , the set of state variables vars, the set of methods
mtds and the mailbox with the capacity of n. We assume that by default self ∈ vars. Each declared
method is defined by the pair (m, b) ∈ mtds, where m defines the message type communicated
between actors, and the name of the method used to serve messages of type m. Furthermore, b
contains the sequence of statements comprising the body of the method. For example the actor
client of Figure 4 is specified by (client , {l}, {(reply , 〈l =?(0, 1); , if (l == 0) {server !request ; }
else {server !delay ; }〉)}, 10). The set of AML models is specified by 2Actor ×Stat∗, where the second
component corresponds to the main block consisting of a sequence of message send statements.
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A given AML model is called well-formed, if no two state variables and methods of an actor or
two actors have identical names, identifiers of variables, methods and actors do not clash, the main
block is restricted to send statements with non-self receivers and the receiver of a message has a
method with the same name as the message. Also all actor accesses, message communications and
variable accesses occur over declared ones. In the following we restrict to well-formed AML models.
2.2.3 Semantics
The formal semantics of AML models is given in terms of LTSs. To this aim, we make a few
definitions and assumptions.
Let Val = N ∪ ID contain all possible values that can be assigned to the state variables or to
be used within the expressions. We treat the value 0 as false and others as true in conditional
statements. Furthermore, we define the set of all variable assignments as Env = Var → Val . As the
main focus is on the message passing and the interleaving of actor executions, we abstract away
from the semantics of expressions by assuming the function evalv : Expr → Val which evaluates
an expression for a specific variable assignment v ∈ Env . We also consider evalv is lifted to the
sequence of expressions: evalv(〈e1, e2, . . . , en〉) = 〈evalv(e1), evalv(e2), . . . , evalv(en)〉.
We exploit the auxiliary functions svars : ID → 2Var , methods : ID → 2MName , qSize : ID → N,
and cap : ID → N to denote the state variables, the set of method names, the current size and the
mailbox capacity of a given actor identifier, respectively. Furthermore, we use body : ID×MName →
Stat∗ to denote the body of the given method name declared by the given actor identifier.
We provide the coarse-grained semantics of AML in which the execution of methods are non-
preemptive, i.e., when an actor takes a message, it executes the entire body of the method before
starting execution of another method. Therefore, the executions of statements in a method are not
interleaved, in contrast to the fine-grained semantics.
Definition 1 The coarse-grained semantics of an AML model M = (actors, σ0), where actors ⊆
Actor and σ0 ∈ Stat∗ denotes the sequence of send statements of the main block, is given by a
labeled transition system TS (M) = (S,Actc,⇒, s0) such that:
– S = ID → Env ×MName∗ × Stat∗ is the set of global states. The global state s maps an actor
identifier to its local state. The local state of an actor (x, vars,mtds, n) ∈ actors is defined by
the triple (v, q, σ), where v gives the values of its variables, q : MName∗ is the mailbox of the
actor with the capacity of n, and σ : Stat∗ contains the sequence of statements the actor is going
to execute to finish the service to the message currently being processed.
– s0 is the initial state, where all state variables are initialized to zero and the auxiliary variable
self is initialized to the actor identifier. Also the messages specified in the main block are put
in the corresponding actors’ mailboxes. Formally, s0(x) = ({z 7→ 0 | z ∈ svars(x)} ∪ {self 7→
x}, cq(x, σ0), ), where cq(x, σ0) constructs the initial mailbox of actor x from σ0:
cq(x, ) = 
cq(x, 〈x!m|σ〉) = 〈m|cq(x, σ)〉
cq(x, 〈y!m|σ〉) = cq(x, σ), y 6= x.
– Actc = ActT ×Act∗s, where ActT = {tx|x ∈ ID} and Acts = {Snd(m) :: x|x ∈ ID ,m ∈ MName}
are the sets of take and send actions, respectively. Each action expresses that taking a message
from the mailbox is followed by a sequence of send actions.
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– ⇒⊆ S × Actc × S is the smallest relation derived from our two-tiered operational rules given
in Table 1. A state transition only occurs as a consequence of applying the rule Take, in which
the relation ⇒ is defined in terms of the reflexive and transitive closure of the auxiliary relation
→⊆ S × Acts ∪ {} × S. The relation → specifies the semantics of each statement while ⇒
captures the effect of processing a message.
Table 1: AML natural semantic rules: σ, ζ, and T denote a sequence of statements, send actions,
and method names, respectively. Furthermore, expr denotes an expression, z ∈ Var and x, y ∈ ID .
Assign
s(x) = (v, q, 〈z := expr |σ〉)
s
−→ s[x 7→ (v[z 7→ evalv(expr)], q, σ)]
NonDet
s(x) = (v, q, 〈var :=?(expr1, expr2, . . . , exprn)|σ〉)
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n (s −→ s[x 7→ (v[var 7→ evalv(expr i)], q, σ)])
Cond1
s(x) = (v, q, 〈if (expr) {σ} else {σ′}|σ′′〉) , evalv(expr)
s
−→ s[x 7→ (v, q, σ ⊕ σ′′)]
Cond2
s(x) = (v, q, 〈if (expr) {σ} else {σ′}|σ′′〉) , ¬evalv(expr)
s
−→ s[x 7→ (v, q, σ′ ⊕ σ′′)]
Snd
s(x) = (v, q, 〈expr !m|σ〉) , y = evalv(expr) , s(y) = (v′, q′, σ′) ,
qSize(y) < cap(y)
s
Snd(m)::y−−−−−−−→ s[x 7→ (v, q, σ)][y 7→ (v′, q′ ⊕ 〈m〉, σ′)]
Take
s(x) = (v, 〈m|T 〉, ) ,
s′(x) = (v′, q′, ) , ∀y ∈ ID \ {x} (s(y) = (v′′, q′′, )) ,
s[x 7→ (v, T, body(x,m))] ζ−→∗s′
s
(tx,ζ)
===⇒ s′
An actor can take a message m from its mailbox if no other actor is in the middle of processing
a message, as explained by the premise of Take. The effect of processing the message m is expressed
by the semantics of the statements in body(x,m), captured by the reflexive and transitive closure of
a−→, denoted by ζ−→∗ where ζ ∈ Act∗s, and is defined as s −→∗s and s ζ−→∗s′ ∧ s′ a−→ s′′ =⇒ s
ζ⊕〈a〉−−−−→∗s′′.
Rule Assign explains that the state variable of an actor is updated by an assignment statement.
The non-deterministic assignment statement, non-deterministically chooses one of the values of its
input expressions and assigns it to the specified state variable, as expressed by the rule NonDet . The
behavior of the conditional statement is given by the rules Cond1,2. A message is successfully sent
to another actor (or itself) if the mailbox of the recipient actor is not full, and as a consequence the
message is inserted into the actor’s mailbox, as explained by the rule Snd . Otherwise, a deadlock
will occur in the model. We remark that the sender identifier, denoted by expr in the rules Snd , can
be either an actor identifier y ∈ ID or the reserved word self which is mapped to its corresponding
identifier by evalv.
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We use the notation Ao19Ao29. . .9Aon to denote the LTS induced from the actors Ao1 , Ao2 , . . . ,
Aon , using the coarse-grained semantic description of AML.
2.3 The Direct Approach Towards Assumption Generation
The direct approach of [34] aims at finding the weakest assumption that describes those environ-
ments of a component that their composition with the component satisfies a safety property. In this
approach the component and the property are specified by LTSs. From the LTS of the property, an
error LTS is generated that traps all the traces violating the property with a pi state. As we have
been inspired by this approach, we briefly explain its steps.
1. Composition and minimization In order to compute the violating traces of the system, the
CSP-like parallel composition of the error LTS and the component is computed by which either
they evolve simultaneously by performing the same actions or only one proceeds by performing
actions not common with its counterpart. In addition, the internal actions of the system are
turned into τ . These are the actions not controlled by the environment. The resulting LTS is
minimized using an arbitrary congruence which preserves the error traces. At this stage, if the
pi state is not reachable, it is concluded that the property is satisfied in any environment.
2. Backward error propagation First those states from which the pi state is reachable only
through τ transitions are turned into pi by a backward analysis. Then all pi states are merged
into a single pi state by integrating their transitions while self-loops are removed. This prunes
those states which the environment cannot prevent being entered into the pi state via internal
actions. If the initial state is pruned, then it is concluded that no environment can prevent the
system from entering the error state and therefore the property is violated in any environment.
Since only the error traces are of interest, those states that are not backward reachable from
the pi state are also pruned.
3. Property extraction Treating τ transitions as -moves, the LTS of the previous step can be
made deterministic by using the well-known subset construction method [56]. Consequently τ
transitions are eliminated and the LTS is also made complete by adding missing transitions of
the states. These transitions, leading to a newly added sink state θ, are those behaviors that
are not exercised by the component. Adding such transitions generalizes the assumption, and
hence environments with such additional behaviors become acceptable. We remark that each
state of the resulting deterministic LTS is a subset of the states of the original nondeterministic
LTS. Therefore, states of the resulting deterministic LTS containing the pi state are treated as
pi. Finally, the assumption is achieved by removing the pi state and its transitions.
These steps have been applied to an open system consisted of “Mutex” and “Writer”, as specified
by Figure 5a. “Mutex” component controls accesses to a critical section. It may receive requests to
access from either Writer or the environment. We aim to find an assumption for the environment
which guarantees mutual access to the critical section, called the mutual exclusion property (its
error LTS is specified by Figure 5b). Figure 5c illustrates the resulted LTS after applying step 1 by
which the parallel composition of the property and the components is computed while the actions
of Writer component, i.e., W .acquire, W .release, W .enterCS , and W .exitCS are turned into τ .
As state 1 is backward reachable from pi through a τ transition, it is merged to the pi state by
the backward error propagation step as shown in Figure 5d. After adding the missing transitions,
identified by the dashed lines in Figure 5e, and removing the pi state, the assumption is achieved.
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Fig. 5: The steps of assumption generation [34]: the states with the label of 0 are initial
As imposed by the Mutex, the actions E .acquire and E .release can only alternate and therefore, the
access of any acceptable environment to the critical section is definitely protected by the Mutex.
Behaviors leading to the sink state, such as E .release in the state 0, are inconsequential as Mutex
is not able to do such an action.
2.4 Formalization of Correctness Properties
A safety property P can be specified by a Linear Time Logic (LTL) formula ([43]) over αP as
the set of atomic propositions. A given LTL property can be validated to be safety by using the
approach of [6]. The semantics of LTL formula P is defined as a language of all infinite words over
the alphabet αP which satisfy P .
Any infinite word that violates a safety property P , starts with a finite bad prefix [11]. A
Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA) accepting the bad prefixes of a safety LTL property P ,
denoted by Perr , can be formed using the approach of [48], to reduce the verification to reasoning
about finite words: a system satisfies P if none of its computations has a bad prefix. Formally, Perr
is a quintuple (Q,Σ, ∂, q0, {pi}) where Q is the set of States, q0 is the initial state and ∂ is the
transition relation ∂ : Q × Σ → Q where for all states q ∈ Q and all symbols  ∈ Σ, |∂(q, )| = 1.
The unique accept (or final) state of Q is called pi which traps all possible violations of P . Therefore,
a verification problem can be easily decided by inspecting the reachability of pi. This idea was used
by [34] in generating an assumption.
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1 actor left (2) {
3 initialL {
4 mutex!reqL;
5 }
6 permitL {
7 //access critical section
8 mutex!release;
9 mutex!reqL;
10 }
11 }
13 actor right(2) {
15 initialR {
16 mutex!reqR;
17 }
18 permitR {
19 //access critical section
20 mutex!release;
21 mutex!reqR;
22 }
23 }
25 main {
26 left ! initialL ;
27 right ! initialR ;
28 }
Fig. 6: Specification of open system
In following we consider Σ ⊆ Acts as our atomic propositions. Hence, properties are defined on
send actions.
3 Assumption Generation
According to the problem definition, a system is composed of several components which com-
municate through message passing. This setting makes the AML model a suitable candidate for
specification of the system components. In our context, the specification of a component of the
system which operates as a service is assumed unavailable. This component is addressed as M . The
set containing the rest of the system components, which are all specified in AML, is addressed as
the open system O.
Our generation algorithm exploits an overapproximated actor for the undefined component M .
Furthermore, it computes the effect of the given property on the behavior of the system efficiently
by generating a so-called property LTS . Finally by refining this LTS, an assumption is generated.
In the following we first describe our running example and afterwards we go through the gener-
ation of the overapproximated actor and the property LTS. We then elaborate on the steps of the
actual assumption generation and in the end we explain how a given actor can be checked against
the generated assumption.
Running Example
We present our approach through an example. The system contains three actors: left , right , and
mutex . The actors left and right that constitute the open system (Figure 6), communicate through
reqL and reqR messages respectively with mutex to request for permission to enter the critical
section. The actor mutex plays the role of the unspecified component and responds with permitL
and permitR to grant access to left , right respectively if the critical section is not currently occupied.
Furthermore, left and right send a release message to mutex upon exiting the critical section.
The required property ensures mutual exclusion over the critical section, specified by P and its
corresponding Perr in Figure 7. Note that an edge from a state q to a state q
′ labeled with formula ϕ
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10 pi
α ∨ β
γ
α ∨ β
¬(α ∨ β)
¬(α ∨ β ∨ γ)
α = Snd(permitL) :: left
β = Snd(permitR) :: right
γ = Snd(release) :: mutex
Fig. 7: Perr for property P =  ((α ∨ β)→ ¬(α ∨ β)
⋃
γ)
means that there are transitions q
a−→ q′ for all a ∈ αP (a |= ϕ), where a |= true, a |= a, a |= ϕ1ϕ2
if a |= ϕ1  a |= ϕ2 with  ∈ {∧,∨}, and a |= ¬ϕ if a 6|= ϕ.
3.1 Overapproximating the Unspecified Component
To generate an actor which is an over-approximated interface of the missing actor, we assume that
some basic information on the interactions of the open system with its environment is available.
Software components are usually developed based on some sort of documentation and therefore
this information can be either provided by the system modeler or extracted from the software
documents. For example by using UML activity or sequence diagrams, one can easily extract the
interface communications of components, based on the intended level of abstraction. A more gen-
eral abstraction is more appealing due to reduction in the preparation effort of such information.
Furthermore, the essence of asynchrony necessitates that the order of sending messages to different
actors is not of importance. Therefore, we are only interested in information about the messages
sent to M by the components of O and an over-approximation of the messages that Os components
can receive in response.
Formally we describe this information by a set of pairs of type MName×2(MName∗×ID), denoted
by Info. Each pair (m, I) ∈ Info, where I = {(rIi , oIi )| 0 ≤ i ≤ k}, expresses that the actor AoIi ∈ O
expects to receive the message sequence rIi from M after the message m is sent to M . By Info, we
aim to characterize the most general behaviors expected from an unspecified component. In other
words, any actor playing the role of M should not exhibit any behavior beyond it. Such actors are
said to be in compliance with Info (the notion of compliance will be explained in Section 3.4.2). If
the information of Info is not accurate, in the sense that the response of Info to the message m is
more or less than what really the components of O expect, then our approach still works but the
set of possible Ms will change accordingly due to the notion of our compliance. In other words,
only Ms triggering responses specified by Info, may be accepted.
To cover cases such that the open system expects to receive multiple possible sequences of
responses by different actors of O, multiples of (m, I1), . . . , (m, Ij) for some j > 0 can be used.
For example, Info = {(m1, {(〈m11,m12〉, o1), (〈m21〉, o2)}), (m1, {(〈m31〉, o3)}), (m2, {(〈m31〉, o3)})}
explains that the components of O expect one of two possible scenarios to happen in response
to sending m1 to M : Either o1 receives m11 and then m12 and also o2 receives m21, or only o3
receives m31. In response to sending m2, o3 expects to receive m31. The usage of sets belonging to
2(MName
∗×ID) instead of sequences is justified by the fact that in most asynchronous systems there
is no guarantee that messages are received by different actors in the order they have been sent. A
description of Info is called well-formed if for all (m, I) ∈ Info and for all (r, o) ∈ I, len(r) is less
than or equal to the capacity of the actor Ao. In following, we only consider well-formed Infos.
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Example 1 For the case of our example, since the goal of the system is mutual access to the critical
section, it is reasonable to assume that the open system expects to eventually receive permitL
in response to reqL, permitR in response to reqR and upon sending release, it does not expect a
response. Hence, Info = {(reqL, {(〈permitL〉, left)}, (reqR, {(〈permitR〉, right)}), (release, {})}.
We use Info to form an actor as a stub for the unspecified component M . This actor which is an
overapproximated interface for M , is called AInfM . The idea is to compose this replacement of M
with the components of O by using Perr to produce an LTS in such a way that the error traces of the
system are computed. We then reconfigure this LTS to produce the assumption. The actor AInfM is
defined such that for each pair (m, I) ∈ Info, a method with the same name as m will be defined. In
the body of m, the messages in the message sequence rIi of each (r
I
i , o
I
i ) ∈ I will be sent to the actor
oIi . If there exists multiple pairs for a message m in Info, then in the body of the method serving m,
the sequence of messages will be sent to the corresponding actors nondeterministically. Due to the
nature of asynchrony, the order of messages sent to different actors should not be of importance. As
the order of send actions in the labels of an AML semantic model are the same as the order of their
corresponding send statements, we implement this property during the construction of InfM . Thus,
any order between sending the messages of the sequences rIi and r
I
j to the actors o
I
i and o
I
j should
be considered while the order of messages in each sequence should be preserved. We remark that
the order of messages from a sender to a receiver is preserved in actor models which conforms to
the reality of most asynchronous communicating systems [72]. To this aim, we exploit an auxiliary
function shuffle(I) which interleaves the message sequences to different actors, as defined by I,
accordingly:
shuffle(∅) = ∅
shuffle({(r, o)} ∪ I) = xshuffle(o!r, shuffle(I))
xshuffle(σ, ∅) = {σ}
xshuffle(σ1, {σ2}) = hshuffle(σ1, σ2)
xshuffle(σ1, {σ2} ∪ Υ ) = hshuffle(σ1, σ2) ∪ xshuffle(σ1, Υ ), where Υ 6= ∅
hshuffle(, σ) = σ
hshuffle(σ, ) = σ
hshuffle(〈x!m1; 〉 ⊕ σ1, 〈y!m2; 〉 ⊕ σ2) =
〈x!m1; 〉 ⊕ hshuffle(σ1, 〈y!m2; 〉 ⊕ σ2) ∪ 〈y!m2; 〉 ⊕ hshuffle(〈x!m1; 〉 ⊕ σ1, σ2)
where o!r abbreviates sending the message sequence r to the component o and is defined by the
equations o! =  and o!〈m|T 〉 = 〈o!m; 〉 ⊕ o!T . The auxiliary function xshuffle inserts the send
statements of o!r randomly into the send statement sequences of its second operand with the help
of hshuffle. This function interleaves the statements of two sequences arbitrarily while preserving
the order of send messages in each sequence.
We would have got a considerable practical gain if such reorderings could had been handled
semantically through an appropriate notion of equivalence such as may-testing [69,15] instead of
explicit shuffling of the messages in each message body of InfM . Due to the non-existence of a
practical tool to compare the traces regardless of their action orders in our experiments, we were
confined to follow this approach.
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Definition 2 Actor AInfM is denoted by (M, {l},mtdsInfM ,∞) such that for all distinct pairs
(m, I1), (m, I2), . . . , (m, In) ∈ Info for some n ≥ 1, where ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ n (shuffle(Ij) = {σIji | 1 ≤ i ≤
kj}), then {(m, b)} ∪ {(mgIj ,σi , b
g
Ij ,σi) | 1 ≤ g ≤ len(σ
Ij
i )} ⊆ mtdsInfM . The bodies of methods m
and mgIj ,σi are defined by:
b = 〈l =?(1, . . . , n); ,
if(l == 1)
{l =?(1, . . . , k1);
if(l == 1) {self!m1I1,σ1 ; } else {}
· · ·
if(l == k1) {self!m1I1,σk1 ; } else {}}
else {},
· · ·
if(l == n)
{l =?(1, . . . , kn);
if(l == 1) {self!m1In,σ1 ; } else {}
· · ·
if(l == kn) {self!m1In,σkn ; } else {}}
else {}〉
bgIj ,σi =〈σ
Ij
ig
, self!mg+1Ij ,σi ; 〉 where 1 ≤ g < len(σ
Ij
i )
bgIj ,σi =〈σ
Ij
ig
〉 where g == len(σIji )
where σ
Ij
ig
denotes the gth send statement of the sequence σ
Ij
i , the variable l is the state variable
and the capacity of InfM ’s mailbox is set to ∞.
We remark that the modeler can set the mailbox capacity as it fits to its resources and model such
that no deadlock occurs due to a mailbox overflow. Furthermore, the outermost non-deterministic
assignment to l leads to an arbitrarily selection of the response Ij to m while the innermost non-
deterministic assignment results in a random selection of σ
Ij
i , an interleaving of the messages to
the actors defined by Ij . The messages of the sequence σIji are sent one-by-one by using the self
keyword to make our AInfM as general as possible (A given M may send multiple of such messages
together). The outermost non-deterministic assignment to l can be removed if there exists only one
pair (m, I) for the message m in Info while the innermost non-deterministic assignment to l can
be eliminated if only one actor of O expects to receive from M in response to processing m. For
brevity, the statement self!m1Ij ,σi ; in the body of m can be replaced by the body of the method
m1Ij ,σi .
Example 2 For the open system of Figure 6, the generated actor AInfM for Info of Example 1 is
shown in Figure 8. Upon taking a reqL/R message from the mailbox and executing the corresponding
method, a permitL/R message is sent to O in response and after executing a release message no
response message is sent.
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1 actor mutex(4){
3 reqL{
4 left !permitL;
5 }
7 reqR{
8 right !permitR;
9 }
11 release{}
12 }
Fig. 8: The overapproximated InfM for Info of Example 1
The declarative specification of Info is so general that it can be derived independent of the details
in software documents with the least effort. However, it can be enriched by being stateful to support
cases where the expected messages vary as the component interactions evolve. This makes it possible
to construct a more precise AInfM by replacing its non-deterministic behavior with conditions
on sending a message sequence. Such an enrichment does not affect the generality and even the
performance of our assumption generation approach. We inspect the effect of a more accurate Info
on our approach in Section 4.3.1. Furthermore, it complicates the process of compliance checking
due to the involvement of variables. The more accurate Info, requires more information to be
provided or derived from software documents. It is only beneficial in the process of checking a given
M against an assumption as the set of Ms complying with Info becomes more limited.
3.2 Property LTS Semantics
To generate a valid assumption, those traces of the whole system which violate the property are
eliminated. Traditionally this is done by computing the composition of the semantic model of the
specified parts of the system and the property which is inefficient and sometimes even unfeasible
in asynchronous environments due to inadequacy to converge (see Section 3.4 which explains how
the LTS semantic of an open actor-based component is generated). Instead, we introduce a novel
composition operator which computes such error traces efficiently during the derivation of the
semantic model. Intuitively, this operator generates the states of the system only as long as the
property is not violated. To this end, the state space of the system, i.e., O and the interface of M ,
is generated in the same way of the AML semantics while we follow Perr with each action as long
as the error state has not been visited. The generated LTS is called the property LTS.
Definition 3 Given Perr = (Q,Σ, ∂, q0, {pi}) and the actor model M, where TS (M) = (S,Actc,
⇒, s0), we produce the property LTS TS (M⊗ Perr ) = (S × Q,Actc,⇒p, s0 × q0) such that the
transition relation ⇒p is the least relation derived by the rules of Table 1 except Take together
with the rules of Table 2.
Each state of the semantics constitutes two elements: the first denotes the state of the actor
model while the second presents the state of the property. As explained by the rule Exe, the part
of the actor model is updated by the semantic rules given in Table 1 while the property part of the
state is updated using its transition relation ∂ whenever a send action is performed. The rule Take
expresses that the global state changes upon processing a message and afterwards either the error
state of the property is visited or the body of the message handler is fully executed. In the former
case, the global state is turned into pi by this rule. We remark that
ζ−→∗p is reflexive and transitive
closure of
a−→p, defined in the same way of ζ−→∗.
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Table 2: The natural semantic rules of M⊗ Perr .
Exe
s
a−→ s′ ∧ q 6= pi ∧ ((a =  ∧ q′ = q) ∨ (a = Snd(m) :: y ∧ q′ = ∂(q,m)))
(s, q)
a−→p (s′, q′)
Take
s(x) = (v, 〈m|T 〉, ) ∧ (s′(x) = (v′, q′, ) ∨ q′ = pi)∧
∀y ∈ ID \ {x} (s(y) = (v′′, q′′, ))∧
(s[x 7→ (v, T, body(x,m))], q) ζ−→p∗(s′, q′)∧
((q′ = pi ∧ s = pi) ∨ (q′ 6= pi ∧ s = (s′, q′)))
(s, q)
(tx,ζ)
===⇒p s
A property LTS is called well-formed if the error state pi does not have any outgoing transition.
By construction, only well-formed LTSs are considered here. The set of error traces of a property
LTS TL, denoted by errTr(TL), is the set all traces which lead to the error state pi. The following
definition characterizes actor models that satisfy a given property P .
Definition 4 Given the actor modelM = (actors, σ0), where actors = O∪{Ax}, we briefly denote
TS (M⊗ Perr ) by Ax 9P O. We say that Ax 9O satisfies a property P denoted by (Ax 9O) |= P
iff errTr(Ax 9P O) = ∅.
3.3 Generating the Assumption
The following demonstrates the steps of the assumption generation for a given safety property P ,
Info, O, where O = {Ao1 , . . . , Aoı} for some ı ≥ 0, and the unspecified component M . Thus, we
avoid passing them as arguments to the proceeding auxiliary functions. We start by generating the
property LTS and then through several steps of refinement we generate the assumption.
Step 1: First we use Info to build AInfM according to Definition 2. Then, we compute the property
LTS AInfM 9P O and apply the renaming operator ρc1 on it to hide the internal communications of
the open system and InfM . Communications of InfM with itself, introduced as the result of AInfM
construction, and the communications between the components of O are considered internal. The
renaming function c1 : Actc → Actc maps (tx, 〈a1, . . . , ak〉) into (tx, h(setID(x), 〈a1, . . . , ak〉)) where
setID symbolically denotes the set of actor identifiers that any communication between its members
should be hidden: setID(M) = {M} and ∀Ay ∈ O, (setID(y) = {o1, . . . , oı}) with the help of the
auxiliary function h : 2ID ×Act∗s → Act∗s. This function filters out all communications between the
components of its first operand occurred in the sequence of actions given by its second operand,
and is defined recursively as:
h(℘, ) = 
h(℘, 〈Snd(m) :: y|ζ〉) = 〈Snd(m) :: y〉 ⊕ h(℘, ζ) y /∈ ℘
h(℘, 〈Snd(m) :: y|ζ〉) = h(℘, ζ) y ∈ ℘
It is worth noting that the action sequence as a consequence of a take action by M is turned into
either  or a sequence containing a single send action to a component of O.
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Since we are going to eventually check a given actor AM against the generated assumption, we
reconfigure the generated assumption to be consistent with the LTS generated from a single actor
AM (see Section 3.4.1). Through the actor InfM ’s perspective, which has an unknown environment,
it may receive any of its messages at any time and one by one. However, due to the coarse execution
of a message handler, it may receive the sequence of messages entirely through a single action fromO.
Therefore, the reconfiguration process is managed to make our approach general and independent of
the granularity of the semantic implementation. We remark that the coarse semantics is beneficial to
avoid unnecessary interleaving of statement executions of concurrent actors. To this aim, transitions
labeled as (ty, 〈Snd(m1) :: M, . . . ,Snd(mn) :: M〉), where Ay ∈ O, are transformed into a set of
consecutive transitions labeled by Rcv(mi) for each item of Snd(mi) :: M where i ≤ n. Another
reconfiguration is to turn the actions like (tM , 〈Snd(m) :: y〉) into the actions like Snd(m) :: y as
part of our goal to generate the assumption as M ’s perspective in terms of its interactions with an
environment.
Example 3 The actor left takes the message permitL and then sends release and reqL messages to
mutex consecutively. Hence, mutex will receive the messages release and reqL through the single
action (tleft , 〈Snd(release) :: M,Snd(reqL) :: M〉). However, considering mutex as a single actor
with an unknown environment, it may receive any of these messages at any time but consecutively
as the order of messages to the same receiver is preserved in actor models as mentioned earlier.
Thus, the single transition with the label (tleft , 〈Snd(release) :: M,Snd(reqL) :: M〉) is turned into
two consecutive transitions with the labels Rcv(release) and Rcv(reqL) (while a new state is defined
to connect these transitions together). Furthermore, the action (tmutex , 〈Snd(permitL) :: left〉) is
renamed into Snd(permitL) :: left .
The operator ψ is introduced to handle such reconfigurations. For a given LTS TL1 = (SL1 , αTL1 , RL1 , s
L1
0 ),
ψ(TL1) = (SL2 , αTL2 , RL2 , s
L2
0 ) where:
– sL20 = s
L1
0
– αTL2 ⊆ Actr ∪Acts Where Actr = {Rcv(m)|m ∈ MName}
– RL2 is defined such that ∀sL11 a−→ sL12 ∈ RL1 :
– if a = (ty, 〈Snd(m1) :: M, . . . ,Snd(mn) :: M〉) for some n ≥ 1 and Ay ∈ O, then sL21
Rcv(m1)−−−−−→
sL2a11
Rcv(m2)−−−−−→ sL2a12 , . . . , sL2a1(n−1)
Rcv(mn)−−−−−−→ sL22 ;
– if a = (tM , 〈Snd(m1) :: y〉), then sL21
Snd(m1)::y−−−−−−−→ sL22 ;
– if a = (tx, ), then s
L2
1
τ−→ sL22 ;
– SL2 = {sL2i | sL1i ∈ SL1} ∪ {sL2aij | (sL1i , a, sL1k ) ∈ RL1 ∧ a = (ty, 〈Snd(m1) :: M,Snd(m2) ::
M, . . . ,Snd(mn) :: M〉) ∧ n ≥ 1 ∧ 0 < j < n ∧ Ay ∈ O}.
Applying the operator ψ does not change the semantics at all as the order of actions is preserved.
Actions are renamed so that they express the interactions of M with an environment from its own
perspective.
Adopting the first step of [34], we minimize this LTS with respect to any equivalence relation
that preserves the error traces while it may remove τ actions. We exploit the weak-trace equivalence
relation [36]. If the error state is not reachable in this LTS, then the property is satisfied for the
systems containing actors of O and any actor AM that complies with Info. This is reported to the
user and the algorithm is terminated.
Step 2: The resulting property LTS of the previous step contains all the traces of the system
that violate the property. Referring to the fact that the internal communications of InfM , turned
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s0 : ((, 〈initialL〉, 〈initialR〉), 0)
s1 : ((〈reqR〉, 〈initialL〉, ), 0)
s2 : ((〈reqL〉, , 〈initialR〉), 0)
s3 : ((〈reqR, reqL〉, , ), 0)
s4 : ((〈reqL, reqR〉, , ), 0)
s5 : ((, 〈initialL〉, 〈permitR〉), 1)
s6 : ((, 〈permitL〉, 〈initialR〉), 1)
s7 : ((〈release, reqR〉, 〈initialL〉, ), 0)
s8 : ((〈release, reqL〉, , 〈initialR〉), 0)
s9 : ((〈reqL〉, , 〈permitR〉), 1)
s10 : ((〈reqR〉, 〈permitL〉, ), 1)
s11 : ((〈reqL, release, reqR〉, , ), 0)
s12 : ((〈reqR, release, reqL〉, , ), 0)
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Fig. 9: The resulting LTS of step 1: si : ((qInfM , qleft , qright), q) expresses the mailbox contents for
the actors InfM , left, right, and the state of the Perr in the state i.
into τ , do not involve in the safety property P . Thus, τ transitions immediately preceding the pi
state are definitely those generated from the communications among O’s components (achieved by
the computation of the property LTS). Therefore, the second step of [34] can be safely adopted
to propagate the pi state over τ transitions in a backward fashion. Consequently, this step prunes
those states that InfM cannot prevent to be entered into the pi state via τ steps. If the initial state
has become pi after the backward propagation, it is deduced that by only internal actions of O and
possibly of InfM , one can reach the error state from the initial state without any communication
between O and InfM . Hence, for any given M , the property is never satisfied as the pi state is
reachable only by the internal actions of O. Concluding that no AM can prevent the system from
possibly entering the error state. This is reported to the user and the algorithm is terminated. Since
we are only interested in error traces, we also remove states that are not backward reachable from
the error state.
Step 3: We follow [34]’s third step and make the resulting LTS deterministic and complete with
respect to the actions of Acts ∪ Actr. We then omit the error state pi and the transitions leading
to it and the assumption, denoted by the LTS TA, is generated. Adding missing receive actions
to a state is sound as O will not send such messages and any given M will be executed within
the environment O. Furthermore, adding missing send actions is also sound as we consider an
additional restriction in accepting an environment (see Section 3.4.2): a given M must conform to
the information interactions of Info. Thus, adopting this step of [34] is possible for the asynchronous
setting by considering a deterrent step in the process of checking a given M against the generated
assumption.
Example 4 After applying the first step to our running example, the LTS shown in Figure 9 is
achieved. We proceed to the next step as its pi state is reachable. However, this LTS is not changed
by the second step as the actors of the open system and InfM do not perform any internal actions.
Figure 10 demonstrates the generated assumption by the third step which indicate that after sending
a permitL message, no permitL/R message will be sent as long as no release message has been
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Fig. 10: The generated assumption
received. Adding a missing send action, e.g., Snd(permitL) :: left , to the gray state of Figure
10 is safe, as any given M in compliance with Info, does not produce a response staring with
Snd(permitL) :: left upon receiving reqR.
3.4 Checking the Unspecified Component Against the Generated Assumption
The following demonstrates the steps for checking a given M against an assumption TA, based on
the given safety property P , Info, and the open system O where O = {Ao1 , . . . , Aoı}. To this aim,
we will introduce an algorithm to derive an LTS characterizing actor AM in terms of its interactions
with an environment, denoted by TM , and then check this LTS against TA.
3.4.1 Generating the LTS of the Actor AM
Actor AM interacts with its environment in two ways: either it receives a message or it fetches
one from its mailbox and sends its responses. Thus to specify TM , we consider a wild environment
for the actor AM which nondeterministically and continuously sends messages to AM and upon
receiving a message from AM discards it. We construct the LTS of AM by composing AM with
this wild environment and reconfiguring the produced LTS in the same way we reconfigured our
assumption.
For the given actor (M, varsM ,mtdsM , n), we derive the LTS of TM = ρc2(AM 9 AMc 9 Aod1 9
. . . 9Aodı ) where:
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– For each Aoi ∈ O, where 1 ≤ i ≤ ı, a dummy actor Aodi is specified by (oi, ∅, ∅, 0). These actors
discard every messages that they receive due to their mailbox capacity of zero.
– (M c, {l}, {(mc, bc)}, 1) is the complement actor for M with only one method mc, which non-
deterministically sends all the possible messages to AM , with the body bc defined as:
bc = 〈 l =?(1, 2, ..., k); ,
if(l == 1) {M !m1; } else {},
. . .
if(l == k) {M !mk; } else {},
self!mc; , l = 0; 〉
where methods(M ) = {m1, . . . ,mk}.
– The main block for this system contains the sequence 〈M c!mc; 〉.
To minimize the resulting state space of TM , the state variable l of M
c is reset at the end of
the method mc to restrict state evolutions of TM to the changes of the state variables and mailbox
of M . Next, we rename the actions of AM 9AMc 9Aod1 9 . . . 9Aodı to depict M as an open entity.
The labels of the resulting LTS denote either M or M c has taken a message and consequently a
sequence of send actions has been performed. The take information is removed from the labels.
The send actions as the consequence of a message taken by M c are renamed to depict M receiving
such messages with the application of the renaming operator ρc2 where the renaming function
c2 : ActT ×Act∗s → Actr ∪Act∗s is defined as:{
c2((tM , w)) = w w ∈ Act∗s
c2((tMc , 〈Snd(m) :: M,Snd(mc) :: M c〉)) = Rcv(m)
Example 5 Figure 11a depicts the previously unavailable actor AM for our ongoing example. To
generate TM , mutex 9 leftd 9 rightd 9 mutex c is constructed where leftd and rightd are specified
by (left , ∅, ∅, 0) and (right , ∅, ∅, 0), respectively, and the actor mutex c is depicted in Figure 11b. By
apply the renaming operator ρc2 , the action (tmutexc , 〈Snd(release) :: mutex,Snd(mc) :: mutex c〉) is
renamed to Rcv(release) while (tmutex , 〈Snd(permitL) :: left〉) is renamed to 〈Snd(permitL) :: left〉.
Our approach for establishing the LTS characterization of an actor in terms of its interactions
with an environment is consistent with the one proposed for pi-calculus specifications embedding
the actor model [69], where channel names indicate actor names. This approach is based on the
concept of Interfaces that maintain actor names to/by which a message can be sent/received,
called external actors and receptionists, respectively. Intuitively, the receptionists are those actors
of the model that are not hidden from the environment while the external actors are part of the
environment. The environment is dynamic due to the communication of names over the channels.
Since the communicated names cannot be derived from the specification of the model, Interfaces
are exploited. To generate LTSs, a set of semantic rules are provided:
– IN: any message targeted to one of receptionists can be received asynchronously while being
added to the pool of messages.
– OUT: only messages targeted to an external actor can be sent.
– TAU: communications between actors in the model are considered as internal.
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1 actor mutex(3) {
3 int taken;
4 reqL{
5 if (taken==0){
6 left !permitL;
7 taken=1;
8 }else{
9 self !reqL;
10 }
11 }
13 reqR {
14 if (taken==0){
15 right !permitR;
16 taken=1;
17 }else{
18 self !reqR;
19 }
20 }
22 release{
23 taken=0;
24 }
26 }
(a) Previously Unavailable Actor AM
1 actor mutexc(1) {
3 int l ;
6 mc {
7 l = ?(1,2,3) ;
8 if ( l==1)
9 {mutex!reqL;}
10 else{}
11 if ( l==2)
12 {mutex!reqR;}
13 else{}
14 if ( l==3)
15 {mutex!release;}
16 else{}
17 self !mc ;
18 l=0;
19 }
20 }
(b) Actor Amutexc
Fig. 11: Actor AM and its corresponding Amutexc
In our case, the environment is static, Aoids play the role of the external actors and AM is the sole
receptionist. The non-deterministic behavior of AMc imitates the semantic rule IN. By using the
appropriate renaming functions ρc2 and ρc3 (introduced in the following), internal communications
are turned into τ (implementing the rule TAU), and only messages targeted to the external actors
are preserved as expressed by OUT.
3.4.2 Checking the LTS of a Component Against an Assumption
Due to the openness of actors, various notions of equivalence exist based on testing equivalence [1,
69] to compare their behaviors. Both trace and may-testing equivalences [28] are appropriate for
reasoning about safety properties [15]. However, a trace-based characterization of may-testing such
as [15,69] alleviates reasoning, as it does not involve quantification over observing contexts required
by may-testing. Such a characterization captures the essence of asynchrony by permitting receive
and send actions to be delayed through the following rules, adapted to our setting:
1. Receive actions can be commuted.
2. Two send actions to two different receptionists can be commuted.
3. A send and a receive action can be commuted.
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Therefore, traces (of the LTSs characterizing actor models) are partially compared, e.g., by matching
〈Rcv(m1),Snd(m2) :: o1,Snd(m3) :: o2〉 to 〈Snd(m2) :: o1,Rcv(m1),Snd(m3) :: o2〉 where o1 6= o2.
Such rules are not enforced through the operational semantics of our modeling framework, but
are naturally achieved by our approach of generating TM and the assumption. The first rule is a
consequence of the non-deterministic behavior of AMc and the completion step of our assumption
generation algorithm. The second rule is the result of shuffling messages during the construction of
InfM , and finally the third is the result of non-deterministic execution of actors in our semantics (i.e.,
M and O in generating the property LTS and M and M c in generating the LTS characterization).
Therefore, our LTS characterization considers message reordering and hence, trace-equivalence can
be used to compare actors. As we explained earlier, we would have got a considerable practical gain
if the effect of the asynchronous setting on reordering of messages had been handled semantically
through an equivalence relation based on may-testing instead of explicit shuffling of the messages
in the specification (in a message body of InfM ). Due to the unavailability of a practical tool to
partially compare the traces in our experiments to validate our claims, we were confined to exploit
trace equivalence.
To check a given actor AM against the generated assumption, two steps should be followed:
first its compliance with Info is checked and them its LTS characterization is compared to the
assumption.
Step 1. As a precondition to composition of any given actor AM with the actors of O, AM should
comply with Info to respect the prerequisites of O. If AM does not comply with Info, we abort and
notify the modeler.
The reason for this check lies behind our primary assumption which led to a significant reduction
in the size of the generated assumption. In more detail by using Info to generate AInfM , we restricted
AM ’s behavior to what is mentioned in Info and therefore our assumption will not generate a sound
result for any AM with a behavior beyond what has been assumed. For example, if a given AM
sends the messages permitL and permitR in response to a message reqL, it has violated the safety
property P . However, in the generated assumption of Figure 10, the corresponding trace is a valid
one leading to the sink state and therefore, this violation will not be captured if the compliance of
AM is not checked first.
To prevent false positive results, we check that AM respects the prerequisite of O as declared by
Info by computing its responses to each message m. However, M can not be considered in isolation
as the responses of M in processing m may be determined in terms of the behavior of O. To clear
the case, consider Example 6. Additionally to compute a response, messages sent by M to itself
as a consequence of processing m should be also considered as part of the computation. In other
words, messages sent to O as a consequence of such internal communications should be included in
the responses of M to m. As we consider components with bounded channels, responses are finite.
Example 6 Consider the actor mutex in Figure 11a that upon processing the message reqL, it
may send permitL to O or reqL to itself depending on the value of taken. Assume this actor is
composed with a wrongly implemented O such that its right actor does not send release after
receiving permitR. Then, it does not send permitL in response to reqL preceding a reqR by recursively
resending reqL to itself. Therefore, this actor generates either no response or permitL :: left upon
processing reqL. In contract, if it is composed with O specified by Figure 6, it only generates the
response permitL :: left .
Noting to the fact that the responses of M upon processing m differ depending on O with which it
has been composed, we define the notion of compliance. To this aim, we use the notation ζ  y to
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extract the messages sent to the actor Ay from the send action sequence ζ, defined by the equations:
  y = 
〈Snd(m) :: y|ζ〉  y = 〈m〉 ⊕ ζ  y
〈Snd(m) :: x|ζ〉  y = ζ  y, x 6= y
Definition 5 For the given actor AM and Info, we say AM complies with Info (denoted by AM vc
Info) if for any set of actions (tM , ζ1), . . ., and (tM , ζn) caused by first processing m and its
consequent internal communications in any trace of the system AM 9O, ∃(m, I) ∈ Info such that
∀Ay ∈ O ((ζ  y, y) ∈ I), where ζ = 〈ζ1〉 ⊕ . . .⊕ 〈ζn〉.
To avoid computation of AM 9 O and decide the conformance of M in isolation, we propose
a sound approach to approximate the responses of a given AM . To this aim, we execute M as a
standalone actor to first generate its message flow graph, for each method m of AM . This graph,
denoted by MF (m), is achieved from the modulo weak trace equivalence of a special LTS derived
from the rules of Table 3. Intuitively by processing the message m, we compute its consequent
interactions with O. Each state of the mentioned LTS is a pair like (σ, q) where σ and q denote the
sequence of statements to be executed and the queue of messages to be handled as a consequence of
processing m. The initial state is defined by (, 〈m〉). When there is no statement to be executed, a
message is consumed from the queue by the rule Inv to execute its respective body. Rules NoIntr1−3
express that the assignment, non-deterministic assignment, and conditional statements do not make
any interactions with O. Furthermore, no interaction with O happens upon sending a message to
itself, but the message is added to the queue as explained by the rule Intr intern . However, an
interaction with an actor of O occurs by executing a send statement as explained by the rule Intr .
Therefore, the transitions of the resulting LTS carry the labels of Acts ∪ {τ}. We remark that the
effect of variables has been abstracted away as a consequence of rules NoIntr2,3.
Table 3: Semantic rules to derive the special LTS for generating FM (m)
NoIntr1 : (〈stat |σ〉, q) τ−⇀ (σ, q), where stat ∈ {var := expr , var :=?(e1, e2, .., en)}
Intr intern : (〈self!m′|σ〉, q⊕ 〈m′〉) τ−⇀ (σ, q) Intr : (〈y!m′|σ〉, q) Snd(m
′)::y−−−−−−−⇀ (σ, q)
NoIntr2 : (〈if (expr) {σ1} else {σ2}|σ〉, q) τ−⇀ (σ1 ⊕ σ, q)
NoIntr3 : (〈if (expr) {σ1} else {σ2}|σ〉, q) τ−⇀ (σ2 ⊕ σ, q) Inv : (, 〈m|q〉) τ−⇀ (body(M,m), q)
Example 7 Consider the example AM in Figure 11a. The resulting LTS for the method reqL of
this actor is depicted in Figure 13 while the states in a weak-trace equivalence class have been
represented with the same color. The resulting message flow graph contains two states: the initial
(, 〈reqL〉) and the final state (, ) with one transition, labeled by permitL :: left , connecting them.
In the initial state by the rule Inv , the message reqL is taken from the queue while its method body is
loaded, and the state (if(taken == 0) {left !permitL; taken = 1; } else {self!reqL;}〉, )) is generated.
Due to abstracting variables, two next states are generated by application of rules NoIntr2,3. In
the state (〈self!reqL;〉, ), the message reqL is inserted to the queue by application of rule Intr intern
while returning back to the initial state.
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Afterwards, we extract the finite traces of MF (m) which are the sequences of send actions that
are possibly sent to O’s actors as the result of processing the message m. Such traces are those from
the initial state (, 〈m〉) to the end state (, ) computed through a backward analysis by calling
the procedure Backward given in Figure 12. If the message interactions derivable from such traces
are included in Info, then we say AM compiles with Info.
The backward analysis starts from the end state (, ) in a depth-first fashion over the transitions
of MF (m) while the labels over the transition are concatenated. The formal parameter TS of
Backward denotes the graph over which the backward analysis is carried on, s the current state
that has been reached, ζ the most recent computed trace, and result the set of found traces. By
traversing (s′, a, s) ∈⇀ such that a 6= τ , we check that the number of sent messages to each actor
of O does not exceed its mailbox capacity, and no overflow occurs. This is done by first updating
ζ to 〈a〉 ⊕ ζ and then calling isWellformed(ζ). This validation is in line with the well-formedness
property of Info as defined in Section 3.1. When an overflow is detected, the algorithm is immediately
terminated by returning (true, result). A trace is added to result when the initial state is reached.
By recursive invocation of Backward we proceed towards the initial state. The return value of this
recursive call is used to update overflow and result where the local variable overflow accumulates
the overflow validation results of all invocations.
function Backward(TS , s, ζ, result)
bool overflow := false
for all (s′, a, s) ∈⇀ do
if (a 6= τ) then
ζ := 〈a〉 ⊕ ζ
if ¬isWellformed(ζ) then
return (true, result)
if (s′ == (, 〈m〉)) then
result = result ∪ {ζ}
(tempo, tempr) := Backward(TS , s
′, ζ, result)
overflow := overflow ∨ tempo
if overflow then break
result := result ∪ tempr
return (overflow , result)
Fig. 12: Computing finite traces
(, 〈reqL〉)
〈if(taken == 0)
{left !permitL; taken = 1; }
else {self!reqL;}〉, )
(〈left !permitL; ,
taken = 1; 〉, ) (〈self!reqL;〉, )
(〈taken = 1; 〉, )
(, )
τ
ττ
permitL :: left
τ
τ
Fig. 13: The generated LTS for the method
reqL
Lemma 1 For a given actor AM specified by (M, vars,mtds, n) and the set of Info, AM vc Info
holds if (overflow , result) = Backward(MF (m), (, ), , ∅) implies that ¬overflow and
∀ ζ ∈ result , ∃ (m, I) ∈ Info, ∀Ay ∈ O ((ζ  y, y) ∈ I)
Proof Due to the abstraction of variable values, all control flows of a method are considered in
result . Therefore, the real responses of M in the system AM 9O are trivially a subset of result .
If a given AM was rejected as there exists ζ ∈ result such that ∃Ay ∈ O ((ζ  y, y) 6∈ I), then
the validity of ζ (to avoid false negative result) can be checked by using the techniques of concolic
testing [65]. Intuitively, ζ is used to compute a sequence of symbolic constraints corresponding
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each conditional statement within a method. The conjunction of these constraints is called a path
constraint. With the help of symbolic analyzers, we can find the messages that should have been
previously sent by O to validate the path constraint. Intuitively, our approach works for the class of
actors that O exerts all the paths of MF (m). Characterizing such a class and providing an approach
to validate a response are among our future work.
We remark that Info can be provided as an LTS itself to have a more homogeneous approach to
check the compliance. However, this makes the assumption generation process more inefficient as
we have to first derive the LTS of O, second the composition of O and Info, and finally the property
LTS. The declarative approach makes it possible to derive InfM as an actor and consequently benefit
from the special composition for computing the property LTS (without computing the intermediate
LTSs).
Step 2. We check if Tr(ρc3(TM )) ⊆ Tr(TA). If that is the case, then (AM 9 O) |= P where the
renaming function c3 : Actr ∪Act∗s → Actr ∪Act∗s hides the internal send actions of M :

c3(Rcv(m)) = Rcv(m)
c3(〈Snd(m) :: y|ζ〉) = 〈Snd(m) :: y〉 ⊕ c3(ζ) Snd(m) :: y ∈ αTA
c3(〈Snd(m) :: y|ζ〉) = c3(ζ) Snd(m) :: y /∈ αTA
c3() = 
Intuitively, the observable actions of M are defined by the actions of TA, constructed based on
Info. If M sends a message, not included in αTA, it should be those that M has sent to itself and
the renaming function c3 hides them accordingly. By contrast in [34], the traces that contain an
internal action of M , lead to the sink state and hence, are automatically accepted as valid traces
although the property may be violated afterwards. However, it is appealing that the system still
satisfies the property despite these internal actions. Therefore, we hide any action that is internal
to M . For example, the action with the label 〈Snd(reqR) :: mutex 〉 (as a consequence of self!reqR
in Figure 11a) is renamed to τ after performing ρc3 .
3.5 Correctness of Approach
Our approach generates the assumption TA such that it characterizes those components whose
composition with the open system O will satisfy the safety property P . Formally, Tr(ρc3(TM )) ⊆
Tr(TA) if and only if (AM 9 O) |= P where AM complies with Info as stated by Theorem 1. To
provide its proof, the following propositions and lemmas are needed.
Definition 6 indicates that the error traces of TA denoted by errTr(TA) are obtained from the
traces in (AInfM 9P O) that lead to the error state pi on which we have applied the operator ρc1 , to
hide the internal actions of O and InfM , and the operator ψ.
Definition 6 errTr(TA) = {t ∈ αT ∗A | t ∈ errTr(ψ(ρc1((AInfM 9P O)))}, where αT ∗A ⊆ (Acts ∪
Actr)
∗.
Lemma 2 expresses that an error trace in the property LTS ψ(AM 9P O) is a finite trace of
ψ(AM 9O) while Perr reaches pi by traversing the messages involved in the trace.
26 R. Abbasi, F. Ghassemi, R. Khosravi
Lemma 2 For any given property P , ζ ∈ errTr(ψ(AM 9P O)) ⇔ ζ ∈ Trfin(ψ(AM 9 O)) ∧
∂̂(q0, ψ
−1(ζ)) = pi, where Perr = (Q,Σ, ∂, q0, {pi}), ψ−1 : Act∗s → Act∗s converts any action Rcv(m)
in the sequence t to Snd(m), and ∂̂(q, ζ) computes the state reachable from q in Perr through the
communicated messages in ζ and is defined by the equations ∂̂(q, ) = q and ∂̂(q, 〈Snd(m) :: y|r〉) =
∂̂(∂(q,m), r).
Proof ”⇒” By ζ ∈ errTr(ψ(AM 9P O)), we conclude that ∃ ς ∈ errTr(AM 9P O) such that
ς = 〈(tx1 , ζ1)〉 ⊕ . . . ⊕ 〈(txi , ζi)〉, ζ = ζ1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ ζi. Therefore, there exists a finite execution path
(s0, q0)
(tx1 ,ζ1)=====⇒p . . .
(txi−1 ,ζi−1)
========⇒p (si−1, qi−1)
(txi ,ζi)=====⇒p pi such that s0 is the initial state of AM9PO.
By application of the rule Take of Table 2, we can conclude that si−1[xi 7→ (v, T, body(xi,m))], qi−1) ζi−→p
∗(s′, pi) for some message m. By recursively applying the rule Exe, we conclude that si−1[xi 7→
(v, T, body(x,m))]
ζi−→
∗
s′ and ∂̂(qi−1, ζi) = pi while the message body of m is not completely exe-
cuted. Therefore, by the application of the rule Take of Table 1, we conclude that si−1
(txi ,ζ
′
i)
=====⇒ s′′,
where ζi is a prefix of ζ
′
i and the message body of m is completely executed. With a simi-
lar discussion, ∀ 0 < j < i − 1 (sj−1
(txj ,ζj)
=====⇒ sj ∧ ∂̂(qj−1, ζj) = qj). Therefore, 〈(tx1 , ζ1)〉 ⊕
. . . ⊕ 〈(txi−1 , ζi−1)〉 ⊕ 〈(txi , ζ ′i)〉 ∈ Trfin(AM 9 O), and ∂̂(q0, ζ1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ ζi) = pi. Consequently
ζ1 ⊕ . . .⊕ ζi−1 ⊕ ζ ′i ∈ Trfin(ψ(AM 9O)), and ζ ∈ Trfin(ψ(AM 9O)).
”⇐” We show that ζ ∈ Trfin(ψ(AM 9 O)) ∧ ∂̂(q0, ψ−1(ζ)) = pi ⇒ ζ ∈ errTr(ψ(AM 9P O)).
The assumption ζ ∈ Trfin(ψ(AM 9 O)) implies that ζ ′ ∈ Trfin(ψ(AM 9 O)) where ζ is a prefix
of ζ ′ with ζ ′ = ζ1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ ζi−1 ⊕ ζ ′i, s0
(tx1 ,ζ1)=====⇒ . . . (txi−1 ,ζi−1)========⇒ si−1
(txi ,ζ
′
i)
=====⇒ s′′, and s0 is the
initial state of ψ(AM 9O). By application of the rule Take of Table 1, we conclude that ∀ 0 < j <
i − 1 (sj−1[xi 7→ (v, T, body(xi,m))] ζj−→
∗
sj ∧ ∂̂(qj−1, ζj) = qj). Therefore, by application of the
rules Exe and Take of Table 2, it is concluded that (s0, q0)
(tx1 ,ζ1)=====⇒p . . .
(txi−1 ,ζi−1)
========⇒p (si−1, qi−1).
Furthermore, si−1[xi 7→ (v, T, body(xi,m))] ζi−→
∗
p s
′ while ∂̂(qj−1, ζi) = pi and ζi is a prefix of ζ ′i.
Thus, (si−1, qi−1)
(txi ,ζi)=====⇒ pi and consequently ζ ∈ errTr(ψ(AM 9P O)).
The following proposition is used to generalize the result of Lemma 2 when a renaming function
is applied on the property LTS.
Proposition 1 For a LTS TL specified by (SL, αTL, RL, s
L
0 ), t ∈ errTr(TL) if and only if c∗(t) ∈
errTr(ρc(TL)), where c : Act → Act is an arbitrary renaming function and c∗ applies c to the
elements of the input action sequence.
Proof By definition t ∈ errTr(TL) implies that there exists the execution path sL0 a1−→ s1 a2−→ . . . an−→ pi
such that t = 〈a1, a2, . . . an〉. By applying ρc on TL, this path is changed into sL0
c(a1)−−−→ s1 c(a2)−−−→
. . .
c(an)−−−→ pi. Thus, the trace c∗(t) = 〈c(a1), c(a2), . . . c(an)〉 belongs to errTr(ρc(TL)). Its reverse is
proved with the same discussion.
Proposition 2 indicates that TA has no trace with a prefix included in its error traces. Conversely,
each trace not belonging to TA has a prefix included in its error traces.
Proposition 2 t ∈ errTr(TA) if and only if ∀t′ (t⊕ t′ 6∈ Tr(TA)).
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Proof “⇒” By Definition 6, t ∈ errTr(TA) implies that t ∈ errTr(ψ(ρc1((AInfM 9P O))). Regarding
the completion phase of the step three in the construction of an assumption, TA is achieved by com-
pleting ψ(ρc1((AInfM 9P O)) using the subset construction method and then eliminating the pi state.
In other words, TA is generated by removing traces leading to the state pi from ψ(ρc1((AInfM 9P O)).
Hence, definitely ∀t′ (t⊕ t′ 6∈ Tr(TA)).
“⇐” We show that if t′′ 6∈ Tr(TA), then ∃ t, t′(t′′ = t⊕ t′ ∧ t ∈ errTr(TA)). Regarding the third
step towards the construction of TA, t
′′ 6∈ Tr(TA) implies that t′′ has a prefix t leading the pi state
in ψ(ρc1((AInfM 9P O)). Definition 6 implies that t ∈ errTr(TA).
Lemma 3 indicates that if AM complies with Info, then the set of error traces of the system
containing AM and O (from which we have hidden the internal actions of M by employing ρc3), is
the subset of the set of error traces of the system composed of AInfM and O, where the operators
ρc1 and ψ are employed on both sets of traces.
Lemma 3 errTr(ρc3(ψ(ρc1(AM 9P O)))) ⊆ errTr(ψ(ρc1(AInfM 9P O))) if AM vc Info.
Proof Assume that errTr(ρc3(ψ(ρc1(AM9PO)))) 6⊆ errTr(ψ(ρc1(AInfM9PO))) and Perr = (Q,Σ, ∂, q0, {pi}).
Thus, ∃ t ∈ αT ∗A (t ∈ errTr(ρc3(ψ(ρc1(AM 9P O)))) ∧ t 6∈ errTr(ψ(ρc1(AInfM 9P O)))). By Lemma
2 and Proposition 1, t ∈ errTr(ρc3(ψ(ρc1(AM 9P O))))⇒ t ∈ Trfin(ρc3(ψ(AM 9O))) ∧ ∂̂(q0, t) = pi.
Hence by application of Lemma 2 and Proposition 1, t 6∈ errTr(ψ(ρc1(AInfM9PO))) and ∂̂(q0, t) = pi
implies that t 6∈ Trfin(ψ(AInfM 9O)). As O is common in ρc3(ψ(AM 9O)) and ψ(AInfM 9O) and M
(similarly InfM ) act as a service, we can conclude that M upon serving a message m from O, sends
responses different from InfM . Assume ζ as a subsequence of t, be such a responses. By construc-
tion of InfM which sends all possible shuffling of messages for each (m, I) ∈ Info, we conclude that
@(m, I) ∈ Info, ∀Ay ∈ O ((ζ  y) ∈ I) and consequently by Definition 5, AM 6vc Info, contradicting
the assumption.
Lemma 4 For a given AM , Tr(ψ(ρc1(AM9O))) ⊆ Tr(ρc2(AM9AMc9Od)), where O = {Ao1 , . . . , Aoı}
and Od = Aod1 9 . . . 9Aodı .
Proof Assume that Tr(ψ(ρc1(AM 9O))) 6⊆ Tr(ρc2(AM 9AMc 9Od)). Consequently ∃ t ∈ αT ∗A (t ∈
Tr(ψ(ρc1(AM 9O))) ∧ t 6∈ Tr(ρc2(AM 9AMc 9Od))). As M act as a service, the trace t starts with
a receive action by AM and may continue with the responses of AM or other receive actions. As AM
is common in both ψ(ρc1(AM 9 O)) and ρc2(AM 9 AMc 9 Od) and Od is passive by construction,
we can conclude that AM receives a message from O which can not be received from AMc . By the
construction of AMc which non-deterministically sends all messages to AM , this is a contradiction.
Theorem 1 claims that TA is the weakest assumption about the component M that ensures the
safety property P .
Theorem 1 For any given AM such that AM vc Info, Tr(ρc3(TM )) ⊆ Tr(TA) if and only if
(AM 9 O) |= P , where TA is the generated assumption, Perr = (Q,Σ, ∂, q0, {pi}), TM = ρc2(AM 9
AMc 9Od), O = {Ao1 , . . . , Aoı}, and Od = Aod1 9 . . . 9Aodı .
Proof “⇒” We show that for any given AM such that AM vc Info, Tr(ρc3(TM )) ⊆ Tr(TA) implies
(AM 9O) |= P .
The proof is managed by contradiction. Assume that (AM 9 O) 6|= P which by Definition 4
and Proposition 1 implies that ∃ t1 ∈ errTr(AM 9P O) ∧ t2 ∈ errTr(ρc3(ψ(ρc1(AM 9P O))))
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(result ∗), where t2 is achieved from t1 by hiding the internal actions of O and AM (as the effect
of ρc1 and ρc3 , respectively), and removing tx from the actions (tx, ς) while send actions to M
are converted into receive actions (as the effect of ψ). This together with Lemma 3 imply that
t2 ∈ errTr(ψ(ρc1(AInfM 9P O))) and so by Definition 6, we have t2 ∈ errTr(TA) (result †).
From the result (∗), Lemma 2, and Proposition 1, we conclude that ∃ t3 ∈ Tr(ρc3(ψ(ρc1(AM 9
O)))) such that t2 is a prefix of t3. By application of Lemma 4, we conclude that t3 ∈ Tr(ρc3(ρc2(AM9
AMc 9Od))). By the construction of TM , we conclude that t3 ∈ Tr(ρc3(TM )) (result ‡).
The result (†) together with Proposition 2, we conclude that t3 /∈ Tr(TA) while t3 ∈ Tr(ρc3(TM ))
meaning that Tr(ρc3(TM )) 6⊆ Tr(TA) which is a contradiction.
“⇐” We show that for any givenAM such thatAM vc Info, (AM9O) |= P implies Tr(ρc3(TM )) ⊆
Tr(TA). The proof is managed by contradiction. Assume that Tr(ρc3(TM )) 6⊆ Tr(TA) which implies
that ∃ t1 ∈ Tr(ρc3(TM )) ∧ t1 6∈ Tr(TA).
Proposition 2 together with the assumption t1 6∈ Tr(TA) imply that ∃ t2 ∈ errTr(TA) where
t2 is a prefix of t1, and hence by Proposition 1 and Definition 6, t
′
2 ∈ errTr(ψ(AInfM 9P O) and
∂̂(q0, ψ
−1(t′2)) = pi (result ∗), where t2 is achieved from t′2 by hiding the internal actions of O (as
the effect of ρc1).
Since t1 ∈ Tr(ρc3(TM )), by the construction of TM we conclude that t1 ∈ Tr(ρc3(ρc2(AM 9
AMc 9 Od))) and hence, t2 ∈ Trfin(ρc3(ρc2(AM 9 AMc 9 Od))) (result †) and t2 = t′2. By the fact
Tr(T1) ⊆ Tr(T2) ⇒ Trfin(T1) ⊆ Trfin(T2) [11], where T1 and T2 are LTSs, and application of
Lemma 4, we conclude that Trfin(ρc3(ψ(ρc1(AM 9O)))) ⊆ Trfin(ρc3(ρc2(AM 9AMc 9Od))). Thus,
two cases can be distinguished:
– t2 ∈ Trfin(ρc3(ψ(ρc1(AM 9O))): Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 together with the result (∗) imply
that t2 ∈ errTr(ρc3(ψ(ρc1(AM 9P O)))) and hence by Proposition 1, t3 ∈ errTr(AM 9P O),
where t2 is achieved from t3 by hiding the internal actions of O and AM (as the effect of ρc1 and
ρc3 , respectively), and removing tx from the actions (tx, ς) while send actions to M are converted
into receive actions (as the effect of ψ). Concluding by Definition 4 that (AM 9O) 6|= P , which
is a contradiction;
– t2 6∈ Trfin(ρc3 (ψ(ρc1 (AM9O)))): according to the result(†), asAM is common in both ρc3(ρc2(AM9
AMc 9Od)) and ρc3(ψ(ρc1(AM 9O))) and acts an a service, we conclude that AMc is producing
a trace that O does not. Thus, we can safely replace AM by AInfM in ρc3(ρc2(AM 9AMc 9Od))
and claim that t2 6∈ Trfin(ψ(ρc1 (AInfM 9O))) while ρc3 can be safely remove as AInfM does not
include the internal actions of AM . This results that t2 6∈ Trfin(ψ(ρc1 (AInfM 9P O))). By the
third step of our algorithm towards the construction of TA which completes ψ(ρc1(AInfM 9P O)),
we can conclude that t2 ∈ Trfin(TA), and consequently, t1 ∈ Tr(TA) which is a contradiction.
4 Case Studies
To demonstrate the applicability of our framework in real world case studies, we apply it to different
application domains: we first apply it to a small system in the robotic domain and then study the
more complex system of Electronic Funds Transfer.
4.1 Quadricopter System
We apply our approach to verify the distributed controller of a robotic system. This system was
developed in Robotic Operating System (ROS) which is a framework for development of distributed
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controller observer
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quadricopter
Fig. 14: Data flow in Quadricopter system
robotic systems2 and has been applied to develop many complex and industrial robotic systems,
e.g. Husky robot3 and Turtlebot4. ROS provides an infrastructure to compose different modules
together for building a system. These modules are reusable and may be replaced or altered, in time.
When using ROS, different components of the systems communicate by asynchronous message
passing and therefore ROS’s computation model is similar to the actor model. Each processing unit
of a ROS system can be modeled as an actor and communications in ROS code can be transformed
into message passings among actors, as practiced in [72]. Since the components of a ROS system
are reusable, it is appealing to find an assumption (for a specific component) of the system which
specifies a well-defined component of the system. Well-defined in the sense that a correctly specified
component composed with the rest of system will satisfy an arbitrary property.
Figure 14 demonstrates the data flow among the different modules of the Quadricopter system.
The system contains the components: controller , feedback , quadricopter , observer and transmitter
where controller governs movements of quadricopter robot by sending its commands through
transmitter to quadricopter . To this aim, controller computes a direction based on the received
information (from observer) and other parameters and sends an update message to transmitter .
It also notifies observer of the transmitted command (via a ctrlerUpdate message). The compo-
nents feedback and transmitter are the interfaces of quadricopter . Component transmitter translates
update messages to the commands understandable by quadricopter . Quadricopter moves to a dif-
ferent position, after processing a received command. It also measures environmental metrics using
a camera recorder and some other sensors. The measured data are sent to feedback which translates
the data to information comprehensible by observer . Component observer is supposed to validate
this information (based on the previous commands and the received info) and send the necessary
parts to controller (via an update message) which makes the feedback cycle of the Quadricopter
system complete.
Each module of the system might be subject to changes or reversions and therefore can be as-
sumed as the unspecified component. Here we run our algorithm with the presumption that observer
component plays such a role. The specified components of this system are modeled as actors of AML
specified in Figure 15. Since we aim to verify the system against concurrency problems, calculations
2 http://www.ros.org
3 wiki.ros.org/Robots/Husky
4 wiki.ros.org/Robots/Turtlebot
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1 actor transmitter(10) {
3 initial {
4 self !transmit;
5 }
6 transmit {
7 quadricopter!update;
8 }
9 update{
10 self !transmit;
11 }
12 }
14 actor controller (10) {
16 initial {
17 self ! control ;
18 }
19 control{
20 transmitter!update;
21 observer!ctrlerUpdate;
22 }
23 update{
24 self ! control ;
25 }
26 }
28 actor feedback(10) {
30 feedback{
31 observer!update;
32 }
33 update{
34 self !feedback;
35 }
36 }
38 actor quadricopter(10) {
40 initial {
41 self !move;
42 }
43 move{
44 feedback!update;
45 }
46 update{
47 self !move;
48 }
49 }
51 main {
52 controller ! initial ;
53 //transmitter! initial ;
54 //quadricopter! initial ;
56 }
Fig. 15: Actors of the Quadricopter system (open system)
involving the control values of the system have been abstracted away from the message handlers.
The desired property for the system to satisfy is that observer only sends an update message to
controller if transmitter has already sent an update message to quadricopter . The LTL formula
describing this property along side the DFA for the bad prefixes of the LTL formula are given in
Figure 16a.
Based on the system description, controller of the open system expects to receive an update
message in response to the update message sent to observer by controller and does not expect
a response upon sending a notification message by controller . Using this information the Info is
defined as: Info = {(update, {(〈update〉, controller)}), (ctrlerUpdate, {})}. Using Info we generate
AInfM which is the overapproximated replacement of observer , demonstrated in Figure 17a.
We implemented our algorithm twice on this settings: once only controller is initiator and once
the modules of transmitter , controller and quadricopter could all be initiators (i.e., the codes of the
main body are uncommented in Figure 15). In the former case, it was discovered that the property
satisfies for any observer actor which complies with Info, meaning that in the generated property
LTS, the pi state was not reachable and the algorithm was terminated at the first step. In the latter
case, the algorithm terminated with an assumption, illustrated in Figure 16b.
We checked a given observer module (mentioned in the Figure 17b) against the generated as-
sumption which was rejected. Intuitively, quadricopter does not wait for a message from transmitter
to send its message to feedback . Consequently, observer will receive a message from feedback and
then will send its message to controller while transmitter has not sent anything beforehand.
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(b) Generated assumption of the Quadricopter system
Fig. 16: The LTS of Perr compared to the generated assumption
1 actor observer(10) {
3 update{
4 controller !update;
5 }
6 ctrlerUpdate{
8 }
9 }
(a) InfM
1 actor observer(3) {
2 observe {
3 controller !update;
4 }
5 update{
6 self !observe;
7 }
8 ctrlerUpdate{}
9 }
(b) observer actor
Fig. 17: The code of the generated InfM compared to the given observer actor
4.2 Electronic Funds Transfer System
Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) systems operate as the infrastructure for online financial transac-
tions. The components of an EFT system such as automatic teller machines, Point-of-Sale terminals
(PoS), core banking systems and the EFT Switch communicate over message passing [10]. Figure
18 demonstrates the data flow between system components.
The EFT switch (or in short the switch) is a software component designed to route messages to
their destinations. The transactions between system components consist of several messages passing
through the switch. For example, a simple purchase transaction is as follows: the transaction is
originated by a user inserting a card in a PoS terminal, afterwards PoS sends a purchase request
to the switch which in turn forwards the request to the core banking system in order to charge the
user’s account. The core banking system forwards the response back to the switch and eventually
to the PoS and the user.
Furthermore, each transaction may comprise a complex combination of different possible in-
teraction scenarios among the components of the EFT system. For instance, a PoS is configured
to time-out and send a cancel request to the switch if it does not receive the response to a pur-
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Fig. 18: Data Flow in EFT System
chase request from the switch in time. When a user cancels his request voluntarily and its cancel
request is being handled in the switch, if the authentication of the user has been failed beforehand,
then the cancel request should not be sent to the core banking system (because no purchase has
been made). In turn a message should be sent to PoS and it should notify the user of the more
prior event which is the authentication failure. Therefore, in reality EFT systems are error-prone
due to unintentional transaction flows caused by failures in the components and asynchrony in the
communication media.
The implemented system contains two transactions of balance request and purchase request. The
EFT switch itself contains three components, the EFTSwitchCore component receives a message
from PoS and depending on the message type redirects it to either components of balanceTransaction
or purchaseTransaction (balanceT and purchaseT in short respectively). Each of these components
in turn sends the related message to the core banking system (in short core) and eventually the
related response is sent back to user . Full description of the components of the system modeled by
AML is given in Figures 21 and 22 of Appendix A .
Each component of this system could be subject to changes and the system should still satisfy
its requirements despite these changes. Here we considered the component purchaseTransaction as
the unspecified component M . The set of Info conceived for this system is:
Info = {(start , {(〈purchaseRequest〉, core)}),
(purchaseSuccessfull , {(〈purchaseSuccessfull〉,PoS )}),
(insufficientCredit , {(〈insufficientCredit〉,PoS )}),
(cancelPurchase, {(〈cancelPurchase〉, core)}),
(cancelPurchase, {(〈purchaseCanceled〉, PoS)}),
(purchaseCanceled , {(〈purchaseCanceled〉,PoS )})}
The specification of the actor AInfM based on this Info is given in Appendix A, Figure 23.
The required property of the system is that upon a purchase request and consequent canceling
of the request if the authentication of the user has failed, the cancel request should not be sent to
the core and only PoS should be notified of the cancellation. This Property and its corresponding
Perr are specified in Figure 19.
Verification of Asynchronous Systems with an Unspecified Component 33
pi
γβα
η
δ
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Fig. 19: Perr for the Property P =  ((α ∧©β ∧ ♦γ)→ (¬δ ∧ η))
1 actor purchaseTransaction(2){
3 int flag ;// 1: Purchase Request is
sent to Core
4 start{
5 flag=1;
6 core!purchaseRequest;
7 }
8 purchaseSuccessful{
9 PoS!purchaseSuccessful;
10 }
11 insufficientCredit {
12 PoS! insufficientCredit ;
13 }
14 cancelPurchase{
15 if ( flag==1){
16 core!cancelPurchase;
17 flag=0;}
18 else{
19 PoS!purchaseCanceled;}
20 }
22 purchaseCanceled{
23 PoS!purchaseCanceled;
24 }
25 }
Fig. 20: Actor purchaseTransaction
We applied our approach on this setting which terminated by generating an assumption which
has 42 states and 417 transitions. We checked the actor purchaseTransaction of Figure 20 against
the generated assumption which was accepted.
4.3 Evaluation Results
To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we have compared it to the direct approach of [34] in
terms of the state space of their generated property LTSs and assumptions for Quadricopter, EFT,
and our running example systems. To derive the property LTS of a given actor model and Perr ,
common in both approaches, we have exploited the algebraic mCRL2 toolset [36], based on ACP
process algebra [12]. However, we have manually added the respective AInfM to each actor model
to derive the property LTS of our approach. We have also implemented the remaining steps of both
algorithms in a Java program to generate the assumption from the derived LTSs. We remark that
we had to tailor the remaining steps of the approach of [34] in the same way of our approach to be
applicable to asynchronous setting. For asynchronous models, to be implemented purely using [34],
each actor of O should get specified by an LTS, generated by the technique explained in Section
3.4.1. This results in huge LTSs that should get composed together in the next phase. In order to
skip some long primal steps (which may not be feasible under limited resources of time and space),
we decided to generate the LTS of the composition of these actors at once and not to generate each
separately. To this aim, we still need to consider a wild environment for O. To skip this also, we
decided to make the compositions of O and Perr so that Perr would act as the missing component
and as the result a closed LTS would be generated. This is a considerable favor towards the direct
approach benefiting from one of the main feature of our approach which is not to generate states of
the system when the pi state is reached. The rest of the steps for both approaches is based on the
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steps in section 3.3. Hence, only one Java program is needed to apply the remaining steps. Therefore,
our comparison reveals the effectiveness of our interface actor in generating the assumption and
making the algorithm terminating.
To derive the property LTS of a given actor model and Perr , AML specifications of the actors
are transform into a set of processes5. Each actor is encoded as a recursive process parameterized
with a queue as the mailbox and possible state variables, and formed by two sub-processes. One
implements the operational semantics of Take in AML semantic rules: Upon taking a message from
the head of the actor queue, the respective method body is selected in terms of the method name to
be executed. Each method body is implemented by using the conditional and send action prefixes
of mCRL2 while variable assignments are modeled by assigning updated values to them during the
recursive invocation of the actor process. Send action are parameterized by the method names which
is unique for each actor. The other sub-process implements the input-enableness of each actor: Each
actor can recursively receive any of its messages (identified by an operation which outputs the list
of messages of an actor given its identifier) by performing receive actions parameterized with its
method names (which are unique). The corresponding message is then added to the queue of the
actor process. The receive and send actions with the same parameter are synchronized to model
receiving a sent message between two actors. In order to implement the atomic execution of each
method, a scheduler process is defined which gives turn to the actors non-deterministically. Perr
of the given property is also encoded as a process. The special pi state is encoded as a pi action
leading to the deadlock process. To derive the property LTS, the parallel composition of the actor
processes, the scheduler, and Perr are computed such that the processes are enforced to synchronize
on send and receive actions of actors and actions of the Perr . Consequently whenever the process
of Perr reaches to its pi state (modeled by the deadlock process followed after the special pi action)
the whole system goes to deadlock.
We have implemented the algorithm using a Java tool. Our java program, takes the name and
location of the mCRL2 file (which has the specification of the mentioned processes) as inputs,
implements the step one of algorithm by calling mCRL2 commands (creating the property LTS as
the result). The remaining steps of the algorithm are implemented in Java.
The size of the property LTSs and the generated assumptions resulting from both approaches
are compared in Table 4. In all cases, our approach immediately terminates and the property LTSs
and the generated assumptions are smaller thanks to the overapproximated actor. For instance,
in the case of the Quadricopter system with a single initial message, our approach immediately
terminates in step 1, in contrast with the direct approach, as the overapproximated actor prevents
from entering into pi state. The direct approach was unsuccessful in computing the property LTS of
EFT after 1 hour on a system with Corei7 CPU and 8G RAM configurations. Considering the effect
of a given property by promoting the semantic rules of AML, alleviates the state space explosion
problem and hence makes our approach efficient and terminating.
To inspect a given specified actor of M against the generated assumption, we have manually
check its compliance and then exploited mCRL2 to generate ρc3(TM ). To this end, AM was specified
as a process with two subprocesses as before. The subprocess which implements the input-enableness
of the actor, results in AM receiving any of its messages which implements the functionality of AMc
and there is no need to implement odi ’s as in mCRL2 we can implement a process such that send
actions manifest in the resulting LTS without the need for the recipient of messages to exist. We
5 This encoding is available at http://fghassemi.adhoc.ir/AGcode.zip.
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Table 4: Evaluation results
Implemented Approach System under Analysis
Property LTS Generated Assumption
States Transitions Time(s) States Transitions
Asynchronous
AG
EFTS 127 186 43 42 417
Quadri. - Single Init 10 10 1 0 0
Quadri. - Multiple Init 182 343 17 8 22
Mutex 15 21 0 14 68
Tailored Direct
AG
EFTS 224328> 823293> 3600 - -
Quadri. - Single Init 1510 4830 135 20 59
Quadri. - Multiple Init 688 2001 96 9 25
Mutex 22 57 1 21 85
used CADP6 to compare the traces of ρc3(TM ) and TA due to its support for systems with a huge
number of states and transitions.
To validate our results, we verified the system containing open system actors and the given M
against the given property. To this aim, the composition of the closed system AM 9O and Perr was
generated using the mCRL2 toolset again (similar to the above). The property is satisfied by the
system if the pi state is not reachable in the resulting LTS. As we have implemented the pi state
with a pi action terminating in a deadlock state, the pi state is reachable if the action pi exists and is
reachable from the initial state in the LTS AM 9O and Perr . This is checked by the mCRL2 model
checker tool.
4.3.1 Exploiting a More Precise Info
If Info is more accurate, in the sense of being stateful, our approach - with minor changes due to
extending Info and generating InfM - still works. However the set of possible Ms which comply to
Info will become more limited. We have conducted a set of experiments on our running example
to illustrate how using a more accurate Info affects the performance of our assumption generation
algorithm. As a more precise Info leads to a more precise InfM , we have directly used a more
precise InfM in our experiments to observe its impact on the resulting assumption. Such precise
specifications can be derived by adding the variable taken to InfM , specified by Figure 8, and
defining its behavior based on this variable while processing reqL, reqR, and release. Conversely,
they can be characterized based on the lines removed from M , specified by Figure 11a. All resulting
specifications definitely comply with Info. The experiment results, shown in the Table 5, indicate
that a more precise InfM may not affect the performance as extra precision may result in larger
property LTSs and assumptions for different values of a variable. However, all experiments result
smaller LTSs compared to the direct approach. For the cases that the pi state is not reachable in
their property LTSs, the algorithm converges faster and it terminates immediately.
5 Related Work
Compositional verification has been proposed as a way to address the state space explosion problem
in model checking [21]. It uses divide-and-conquer approach to verify a system against a property
6 http://cadp.inria.fr/
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Table 5: Effect of a more precise InfM for Mutex system
Lines Omitted from
Figure 11a
Property LTS Generated Assumption
States Transitions Time States Transitions Time
3,5,7-10,14,16,
17-19,23:(Info)
15 21 3518576 14 68 3087559909
7,16,23 15 21 3546567 14 68 3081696082
16,23 16 21 3565696 15 72 3079037789
23 14 18 3527906 - - 3527906
- :(M) 13 18 3407075 - - 3407075
7,23 16 21 3561963 15 72 3073369906
7 18 24 3617947 11 53 3079523449
7,16 15 21 3551699 14 68 3081989530
16 18 24 3989771 11 53 3082167745
by verifying each of its components individually against a local property [22,37], a technique that
is often called quotienting. In the context of process algebra as the language for describing reactive
systems and Henessy-Milner logic as the logical specification formalism for describing properties,
decompositional reasoning has been originally studies in [49,50] and has been further developed
in, e.g., [13,31,62]. A related line of research is the one devoted to compositional proof systems,
e.g., [8] which determines satisfaction between algebraic processes and assertions of the modal µ-
calculus. This technique provides a set of rules guided by the structure of the processes. The idea
of compositional verification can be formulated as finding a proof for a term with a set of meta-
variables, distinct from recursive variables. These meta-variables denote undefined processes. Thus,
proofs carried out with such variables appearing in the terms, are valid for all instantiations of the
variable. Such a parameterized proof results in an assertion that should be satisfied by the meta-
variable. This assertion expresses possible instantiations for the meta-variable and hence, plays the
role of an assumption in our case. A given M guarantees the whole system satisfies P if a proof
can be found for the assertion. Although this approach is also applicable to non-safety properties,
finding such proofs and assertions cannot be automated and needs an exhaustive user involvement.
To successfully verify an isolated component, it is often needed to have some knowledge about
the environment interacting with the component, and to this end assume-guarantee reasoning ap-
proaches have been proposed to address the issue [46,61]. These approaches guarantee a system S
composed of components M1 and M2 satisfies a property P if M1 under an assumption A satisfies
P and also M2 satisfies A in the context of all possible environments. As we explained earlier,
our problem is reduced to the assume-guarantee reasoning problem where M2 maps to the un-
specified component and M1 plays the role of the open system. To the best of our knowledge the
assume-guarantee reasoning has not been specifically associated with asynchronous environments.
In recent work such as [7,55,59,19], the assumption has been generated through learning-based
approaches by using the L∗ algorithm, first proposed by Angulin [9]. Given a set of positive and neg-
ative traces, an initial assumption is generated which will be iteratively refined by posing questions
to an oracle. These approaches are not time-efficient due to additional overhead to learn assump-
tions [23]. Also the generated assumption may become very large and also the verification may fail
in some cases [54,7]. These approaches are useful when the computations for the generation of the
weakest assumption run out of memory. The other fact that should be considered is that in the
L∗-based approaches in order to produce the assumption, the component M2 is incorporated in the
iterative solution which is in contrast to our original goal of reusing the produced assumption in
different settings and specifically with different M2 components. In other words, despite the solu-
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tion of [7,55,59,19], our solution is independent from M2 and there is no need to generate a new
assumption for each different M2 component. In the future, we plan to investigate more on how to
incorporate learning techniques into our asynchronous setting.
Counter example abstraction refinement technique has been associated with assume-guarantee
reasoning in [14] by iteratively computing assumptions as conservative abstractions of the interface
behavior of M2 which concerns interactions with M1. In each iteration, the composition of M1 and
A is checked against P and based on the achieved counterexample, A is refined accordingly which
makes the approach computationally expensive. Furthermore the aforementioned issue of reusability
due to the iterative incorporation of M2 in computations is also observed in this solution. We also
take advantage of an abstract interface of M2 in our approach using interaction information of M1,
however there is no need for iterative checkings.
The direct approach toward the generation of the weakest assumption has been applied in work
such as [34,20]. In particular in [34], the weakest assumption for the environment of a component is
generated such that the component satisfies a required property. But the generated assumption may
become too large and the computation may run out of memory [24]. We have extended the work in
[34] to asynchronous systems and also made some improvements on handling internal actions. By
assuming some information on the interactions of O, our approach produces an assumption which
is noticeably smaller than the generated assumption in [34].
In [30,38,35,60], the problem of finding the separating DFA of two disjoint regular languages, so
called concurrent separation logic, has been mapped to the problem of assume-guarantee reasoning.
To this aim, the separating automaton A is generated which accepts the language of M2 but rejects
the language of M ′1, where M
′
1 accepts the language of M1 and does not satisfy P . The work in [38,
35] exploits an iterative method using boolean satisfiability solvers. Generally all of these approaches
are computationally expensive while [38] is only suited for hardware verification.
The theory of supervisory control and controller synthesis also tackles a similar problem but
in a very different context. The goal is to synthesis a controller called the supervisor, such that
the behaviors of the system called plant, are controlled so that the requirements of the plant are
satisfied [64,18]. The theory mainly focuses on hardware systems, therefore assuming that the
controller reacts sufficiently fast on machine input, the supervisor and the plant are originally
modeled as synchronizing processes [64,18] and the supervisor allows the occurrence of events of
the plan by synchronizing with them and prevents them by refusing to synchronize. This also
prevails in modern state-of-the art approaches [42,29,57]. The notion of asynchrony in this context
is mostly referred to as events occurring without any reference to a clock [63,25,26] which is very
different from the notion of asynchrony in our context. The problem of controller synthesis is
mapped to our context such that the supervisor is mapped to the unspecified component, system
requirements play the role of the system properties and the plant is the open system. However,
the fundamental difference is that system requirements in a controller synthesis are limited to
the behaviors of the plant and the generated supervisor describes a “well-defined” plant [53,70].
However in our case, the behaviors of the unspecified component are mentioned in the property
and the generated specification describes the unspecified component. In other words a synthesized
controller is a dependent entity controlling the behaviors of the plant, but in our context we synthesis
a component which is a part of the system and has its own independent functionality.
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6 Conclusion and Future Work
We developed a framework for asynchronous systems to successfully verify safety properties of
such systems in the presence of a modified or an added component. This is done by generating
the weakest assumption for the component to be checked against. By applying this framework, we
ignore model checking of the whole system with each modification made to a component of the
system. We adapted the direct approach of the synchronous settings to make it terminating and
more efficient in time and computations. To this aim, we generate an over approximated component
instead of the missing component to make the system of asynchronous components closed and used
the special composition to build the property LTS to eliminate the error traces simultaneously. We
have illustrated the applicability of our work on two real world case studies and shown that the
generated assumptions are significantly smaller. We have also relaxed the condition which restricts
M to the actions of P by considering the internal actions of the unspecified component in our
computations. Therefore, our approach eliminates false positive results as a consequence of such
a condition (In [34] internal actions are led to the sink state after which observable actions may
violate the property). Such improvements are not limited to the asynchronous settings and therefore
can be adopted.
As future work we focus on improving the third step of our algorithm: instead of completing the
generated LTS and exploiting conformance checking to prevent false positive, we find conditions to
steer the completion phase. Another improvement is to imply some reductions on the generated LTS
of a single actor (regarding its interactions) in order to reduce the time and resources for checking an
actor against the generated assumption. Furthermore, providing an approach to validate a rejected
M by our compliance checking is another research direction. Extending our framework with data can
also be considered. We also plan to investigate on how to incorporate grammar inference techniques
into our asynchronous setting.
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Appendix A Actors of the EFT System
1 actor PoS(2){
3 int isCanceled;
4 int flag1 ;
5 //1: ” Insufficient Credit” has
6 // happened while ”cancelPurchase”
7 // has been sent
8 int flag2 ;
9 //1: ”Authentication error” has
10 // happened while ”cancelPurchase”
11 // has been int sent
12 int flag3 ;
13 //1: ”cancelPurchase” has been sent
15 insertCard{
16 user!insertPassword;
17 }
18 passwordIs{
19 user!chooseTransaction;
20 }
21 balanceRequest{
22 eftSwitchCore!balanceRequest;
23 }
24 purchaseRequest{
25 eftSwitchCore!purchaseRequest;
26 }
27 cancelPurchase{
28 isCanceled=1;
29 eftSwitchCore!cancelPurchase;
30 }
32 balanceResponse{
33 user!balanceResponse;
34 }
35 purchaseSuccessful{
36 if (isCanceled==1){
37 flag3=1;}
38 else{
39 user!purchaseSuccessful;}
40 }
41 authenticationError{
42 if (isCanceled==1){
43 flag2=1;}
44 else{
45 user!authenticationError;
46 isCanceled=0;}
47 }
49 insufficientCredit {
50 if (isCanceled==1){
51 flag1=1;}
52 else{
53 user! insufficientCredit ;
54 isCanceled=0;}
55 }
57 purchaseCanceled{
58 if (flag1==1){
59 user! insufficientCredit ;
60 flag1=0;}
61 else{ if (flag2==1){
62 user!authenticationError;
63 flag2=0;}
64 else { if (flag3==1){
65 user!purchaseCanceled;
66 flag3=0;}
67 else{}}}
68 isCanceled=0;
69 }
70 }
Fig. 21: Actors of the Open System of EFT System
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1 actor user(2){
3 int scenario ;
4 start{
5 PoS!insertCard;
6 }
7 insertPassword{
8 PoS!passwordIs;
9 }
10 chooseTransaction{
11 scenario=?(0,1,2);
12 if (scenario==0){
13 PoS!balanceRequest;}
14 else{ if (scenario==1){
15 PoS!purchaseRequest;}
16 else{ if (scenario==2){
17 PoS!purchaseRequest;
18 PoS!cancelPurchase;}
19 else{}}}
20 cenario=0;
21 }
22 balanceResponse{
23 self ! start ;
24 }
25 purchaseSuccessful{
26 self ! start ;
27 }
28 authenticationError{
29 self ! start ;
30 }
31 insufficientCredit {
32 self ! start ;
33 }
34 purchaseCanceled{
35 self ! start ;
36 }
37 }
39 actor EFTSwitchCore(2){
41 int wrongPassword;
42 balanceRequest{
43 wrongPassword=?(0,1);
44 if (wrongPassword==0){
45 balanceTransaction!start;}
46 else{
47 PoS!authenticationError;}
48 wrongPassword=0;
49 }
50 purchaseRequest{
51 wrongPassword=?(0,1);
52 if (wrongPassword==1){
53 purchaseTransaction!start;}
54 else{
55 PoS!authenticationError;}
56 wrongPassword=0;
57 }
58 cancelPurchase{
59 purchaseTransaction!cancelPurchase;
60 }
61 }
63 actor balanceTransaction(2){
65 start{
66 core!balanceRequest;
67 }
68 balanceResponse{
69 PoS!balanceResponse;
70 }
71 }
73 actor core(2){
75 int noCredit;
76 balanceRequest{
77 balanceTransaction!balanceResponse;
78 }
79 purchaseRequest{
80 noCredit=?(0,1);
81 if (noCredit==0){
82 purchaseTransaction!purchaseSuccessful;}
83 else{
84 purchaseTransaction! insufficientCredit ;}
85 noCredit=0;
86 }
87 cancelPurchase{
88 purchaseTransaction!purchaseCanceled;
89 }
90 }
92 main {
93 user! start ;
94 }
Fig. 22: Actors of the Open System of EFT System
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1 actor purchaseTransaction(2){
3 int l ;
4 start{
5 core!purchaseRequest;
6 }
7 purchaseSuccessful{
8 PoS!purchaseSuccessful;
9 }
10 insufficientCredit {
11 PoS! insufficientCredit ;
12 }
13 cancelPurchase{
14 int l=?(0,1);
15 if ( l==1){
16 core!cancelPurchase;
17 }
18 else{
19 PoS!purchaseCanceled;
20 }
21 }
22 purchaseCanceled{
23 PoS!purchaseCanceled;
24 }
25 }
Fig. 23: Actor AInfM of EFT System
